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JUDGES IN LAWYERLESS COURTS 
 
Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan, Jessica K. Steinberg, & Alyx Mark* 
 
110 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) 
 
The typical American civil trial court is lawyerless. In response, access to justice reformers have 
embraced a key intervention: changing the judge’s traditional role. The prevailing vision for judicial 
role reform calls on trial judges to offer a range of accommodation, assistance, and process simplification 
to people without legal representation.    
 
Until now, we have known little about whether and how judges are implementing role reform 
recommendations or how judges behave in lawyerless courts as a general matter. Our lack of knowledge 
stands in stark contrast to the responsibility civil trial judges bear – and the discretionary power they 
wield – in dispensing justice for millions of unrepresented people each year. While today’s civil procedure 
scholarship focuses on documenting and analyzing growing judicial discretion in complex litigation, a 
much larger sphere of unexamined and largely unchecked judicial discretion has been hiding in plain 
sight in state civil trial courts. 
 
At the intersection of civil procedure, judicial behavior, and access to justice, this Article presents a 
theoretically driven multijurisdictional study of judicial behavior. It examines three state civil courts in 
jurisdictions at the top, above the median, and near the median in the Justice Index (a ranking of 
state-level access to justice efforts). Despite significant jurisdictional differences, judges’ behavior is 
surprisingly homogenous in the data. Rather than offering accommodation, assistance, and 
simplification as reforms suggest, judges maintained courts’ legal complexity and exercised strict control 
over evidence presentation.  
 
The Article theorizes that a fundamental structural problem drives this unexpected finding – civil 
courts were not designed for unrepresented people. And judicial behavior is shaped by three factors that 
result: ethical ambiguity and traditional assumptions about a judge’s role in adversarial litigation, 
docket pressure, and systematic legal assistance provided to petitioners only. The Article concludes 
judicial role failure is but one symptom of lawyerless courts’ fundamental ailment: the mismatch 
between courts’ adversarial, lawyer-driven dispute resolution design and the complex social, economic, 
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You don’t come here to the court to have your little disagreement.  
You don’t answer my questions, and you won’t get heard at all.1 
 
It is so hard just to be the referee but also want to get involved.2 
 
State civil trial courts and judges have changed.3 Thirty years ago, nearly every 
party in these courts had a lawyer.4 At that time, lawyers were expected to drive 
litigation through adversarial procedures. Judges had a clear, specific role: passive 
umpire.5  
 
Today, state civil trial courts are largely lawyerless.6 Court data suggest more 
than three-quarters of all civil cases have at least one unrepresented party.7 In some 
areas, such as family law, nearly all cases involve two unrepresented parties.8 In 
America’s civil justice system, millions of low- to middle-income people without 
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and the underlying study would not have been possible without the help of the following stellar research 
assistants: Hilary Adkins, Michelle Bigony, Emily Bock, Anne Bonfiglio, Sophia Goh, Greg Hewitt, 
Esther Jiang, Joshua Katz, Michaela Lovejoy, Aryeh Mellman, Michelle Rodriguez, Seojin Park, Lindsay 
Pearlman Hannibal, Scott McMurtrey, Elenore Wade, Mason Walther, and Ryan Williams. Special 
thanks to Catherine Twigg for her work on data collection. Thanks to our institutions for research 
support. 
1 Quote from a judge interviewed for this study, Centerville Judge 4. See Part II infra for a description 
of this study’s methods. 
2 Centerville Judge 1. 
3 Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan, & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New” Civil 
Judges, 2018 WISC. L. REV. 249 (2018) (describing the access to justice crisis in state civil courts and 
offering a theoretical framework to support future research on trial judge behavior that includes four 
factors: disappearing adversary process, in-person interactions, an ethically ambiguous judicial role, 
and static written law) 
4 See, e.g., CIVIL JUST. SURVEY OF ST. CTS, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 1992 (1995). 
5 See Norman W. Spaulding, Essay, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1391 (2008). 
6 We define lawyerless courts as those where more than three-quarters of cases involve at least one 
unrepresented party. For the best available and most recent nationally representative data, see generally 
Paula Hannaford-Agor et al., The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. & 
ST. JUST. INST. (2015). 
7 Id. at iv.  
8 Many studies show that 80-90 percent of family law cases that do not involve the government involve 
two unrepresented parties. See, e.g., Jessica Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 
CONN L. REV. 746, 751 (2015) [hereinafter Steinberg, Demand Side Reform]. 




counsel or legal training must protect and defend their rights and interests in courts 
designed by lawyers and for lawyers.9  
 
To make matters worse, the issues at stake in these courts are deeply connected 
to fundamental human needs such as safety, intimate relationships, housing, and 
financial security.10 Many people who find themselves pulled into civil court for issues 
ranging from medical debt to guardianship of an aging parent are already suffering the 
consequences of America’s fraying—or nonexistent—social and economic safety 
nets.11 Too many of those who must represent themselves in civil trial courts are 
already living at or close to the edge of any person’s capacity for self-advocacy.  
 
Over the past two decades, legal scholars, judges, and other experts have 
advanced a key intervention for lawyerless courts: a revised judicial role where judges 
cast away traditional passivity to assist and accommodate litigants without lawyers.12 
Proponents have highlighted the practicality and efficiency of judicial intervention in 
pro se cases, particularly when compared to the cost of providing legal assistance and 
services for every litigant before they enter the courtroom.13 As this vision has taken 
 
9 We and other scholars have written and conducted extensive empirical research to document the civil 
justice challenges facing low- to middle-income people, including those who end up involved in 
litigation and those whose legal problems never make it to a lawyer or see the inside of the courtroom. 
See, e.g., Rebecca Sandefur, What We Know and Need to Know About the Legal Needs of the Public, 67 S.C. L. 
REV. 443 (2016) [hereinafter Sandefur, What We Know]; Michele Statz, Robert Friday & Jon Bredeson, 
Why Prevailing Access to Justice Initiatives Fail Rural Americans (on file with authors); Lauren Sudeall & Daniel 
Pasciuti, Praxis and Paradox: Inside the Black Box of Dispossessory Court in Suburban and Rural Georgia (on file 
with authors); Tonya L. Brito, Producing Justice in Poor People’s Courts: Four Models of State Legal Actors, 24 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 145 (2020); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 305; 
Llezlie Green, Wage Theft in State Courts, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1303 (2019); Justin Weinstein-Tull, The 
Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (“Local courts—and not federal courts—are the 
starting point from which we should define and evaluate our system of justice.”); Jessica K. Steinberg, 
A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1580 (2018); Allyson E. Gold, No Home for 
Justice: How Eviction Perpetuates Health Inequity Among Low-Income Tenants, 24 GEO. J. POV. L. POL’Y  60 
(2017); Victor Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design, 121 PENN STATE L. REV 745 (2017); Mary 
Spector & Ann Baddour, Collection Texas-Style: An Analysis of Consumer Collection Practices in and out of the 
Courts, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1427 (2016); Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1296 (2016); Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little 
Representation be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L. J. 1367 (2016); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining 
Access to Justice in the Poor People's Courts, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY L.  & POL’Y 473 (2015); Peter A. Holland, 
Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 
179 (2014); Tanina Rostain, Techno-Optimism & Access to the Legal System, 148 DAEDALUS 93 (2019); 
Rebecca L.  Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949 (2009). See also, Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of State 
Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 2101 (2019) (positing that federal court expansion may lead to 
underinvestment in state-level courts). 
10 See Sandefur, What We Know, supra note 7, at 443–44.  
11 Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality, 148 DAEDALUS 128, 
133 (2019) (arguing that state civil courts have become the government institution of last resort in a 
system where the legislative and executive branches have either perpetuated or ignored growing 
economic and social inequality). 
12 See infra Part I for a full discussion of these arguments and this scholarship. 
13 See e.g. Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227 
(2010) [hereinafter Barton, Against Civil Gideon]; Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging 




hold and rates of pro se cases have grown, judges have been charged with new 
expectations, including simplifying courtroom procedures, filling information gaps for 
unrepresented people, actively developing the factual record in trials, identifying legal 
issues, and otherwise exercising vast and nearly unfettered discretion to patch holes in 
our state-level civil justice systems.14 In response to these calls for change, many states 
have altered judicial ethics rules to provide that “reasonable accommodations” for pro 
se litigants do not violate a judge’s duty of impartiality—a voluntary approach to 
judicial role reform. Such change has spurred state court systems and think-tanks to 
create training and guidance materials encouraging judges to assist people without 
counsel and offering best practices.15 
 
Though this shift in the judicial role has been unfolding across the country for 
decades, few studies have documented how judges interact with unrepresented people 
in state trial courts.16 And, until now, we have lacked comparative, empirical data about 
changes in judicial interactions with pro se litigants. Historically, as we have explained 
and analyzed in previous work, legal scholars have generally ignored state civil trial 
courts.17 Today, most civil procedure and judicial behavior scholarship focuses on 
complex and appellate litigation in federal courts. In these courts, the bulk of case 
 
Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (2012); NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. 
CTS., JUST. FOR ALL INITIATIVE GUIDANCE MATERIALS 32 (2019), 
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/25464/pdf-jfa-guidance-materials.pdf 
[hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL MATERIALS]. 
14 For previous work describing and defining the changing judicial role and the evolution of procedural 
norms in courts where most cases lack lawyers, see generally Hannah Lieberman, Uncivil Procedure: How 
State Court Proceedings Perpetuate Inequality, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 257 (2016) (critically reviewing the 
operation of civil procedure in consumer debt cases); Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra 
note 3; Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 
2016 BYU L. REV. 899 (2016) [hereinafter Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown] (describing the breakdown of 
adversary procedure in ordinary, two-party cases including judges’ confusion about their proper role 
and calling for an affirmative duty for courts and judges to drive civil litigation in pro se courts); Colleen 
F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access to Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 
215 (2018) (examining how judges can increase or decrease access to courts through pre-hearing 
procedures); Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647 (2018) 
(offering three possible dimensions of active judging behavior to assist pro se litigants in and presenting 
data on the prevalence of these behaviors). 
15 See infra Part I(C). 
16 For other examples from a small body of research, see id.; Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: 
Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); John 
M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Judicial Decision Making 
in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467 (1988); Michele Cotton, A Case Study on Access to Justice and How 
to Improve It, 16 J.L. & SOC’Y 61 (2014); Vicki Lens et al., Choreographing Justice: Administrative Law Judges 
and the Management of Welfare Disputes, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 199 (2013). 
17 For discussions about and explanations of why legal scholarship has paid so little attention to state 
civil courts, see Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 3; Stephen C. Yeazell, Courting 
Ignorance: Why We Know So Little About Our Most Important Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 129 (2014). Today, this 
trend appears to be changing as more scholars have begun exploring state civil justice. See, e.g., Justin 
Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1031 (2020); Zachary D. Clopton, 
Making State Civil Procedure, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2019); Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local 
Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707 (2015); Annie Decker, A Theory of Local Common Law, 
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1939 (2014). 




processing activity and party engagement with court procedures occurs outside the 
courtroom via the exchange of pleadings.18 Scholars writing about federal courts are 
concerned with an expanding sphere of unreviewable judicial discretion and the 
phenomena of ad hoc, party-driven procedural rules.19 Some critics argue these trends 
lack transparency, do not reflect democratic values, and ultimately damage judicial 
legitimacy.20 These same concerns apply to the evolving judicial role in state civil trial 
courts. 
 
The unfettered discretion of trial judges in lawyerless courts is a pervasive and 
troubling phenomenon. In these courts, most parties lack representation, appeals are 
rare, and court records are sparse and difficult to access.21 Party engagement with 
judges and procedures happens in real-time, in the courtroom, with little to no 
discovery or exchange of pleadings.22 Often, no lawyer other than the judge is involved 
in observing, let alone driving, the litigation process. The oversight and advocacy 
functions normally performed by lawyers are absent. In lawyerless courts, a lack of 
party control over procedure collides with nearly unfettered and unreviewed judicial 
discretion.23 Moreover, civil defendants are disproportionately women and people of 
color, which may influence how judicial discretion is implemented in these courts.24 
 
 
18 Most legal scholarship that does engage with state-level civil justice focuses on state appellate 
courts. See e.g., Marin K. Levy, Packing and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (2020).  
19 See e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821 (2018); Robin Effron, Ousted: 
The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2018); David L. Noll, 
What DO MDL Leaders Do?: Evidence from Leadership Appointment Orders, 24 LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV. 
433 (2020); Pamela Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (2017). For a 
seminal work on judicial intervention and management in complex litigation, see generally Judith 
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).  
20 Robin Effron has made the case that, in the complex litigation context, the growing sphere of judicial 
discretion is linked to private procedural ordering, with parties increasingly co-managing litigation in 
collaboration with managerial judges. See Effron, supra note 18, at 169–174. 
21 See Decker, supra note 16, at 1968–69 (discussing factors that make appeals from lower courts 
unlikely); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, LPE Blog (July 21, 2021) available at 
https://lpeproject.org/blog/market-based-law-development/ (comparing the experiences of litigants 
in federal and state and noting the lack of representation in state trial courts and the near-absence of 
appeals by people without counsel); Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little 
Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1387 (2016) (discussing the importance of law 
reform activity, including appeals, in state civil courts and arguing that such activity is rare where parties 
lack full lawyer representation). For related methodological discussions, see Catherine R. Albiston & 
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101 (2013) (setting 
out an expansive agenda for access to justice research and calling for scholars to make a range of 
theoretical and empirical contributions to better understand the operation of the civil justice system, 
including how everyday Americans experience law and the justice system); Carpenter, Steinberg, 
Shanahan & Mark, supra note 3. 
22 See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Helping the Pro Se Litigant: A Changing Landscape, 39 CT. REV. 8, 14–15 
(2003). 
23 For example, see Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 40 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
55, 78-80 (2018) (describing the unrepresented tenants’ lack of power in eviction matters).  
24 See generally Kathryn Sabbeth & Jessica Steinberg, The Gender of Gideon, 69 UCLA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2022) 




This Article presents findings from a study investigating judicial behavior in 
lawyerless courts through a comparative, multijurisdictional research design. The study 
leverages key similarities and distinctions among jurisdictions to examine our 
assumptions about judicial behavior. The jurisdictions are geographically, 
demographically, and politically varied and rank at the top, above the median, and near 
the median of the Justice Index – a measure of access to justice reform.25 The data 
show how judges from different parts of the country use their discretion and 
responsibility as they manage civil litigation in live hearings, including whether and 
how they alter the traditional judicial role to assist or accommodate people without 
counsel.  
 
The study data capture judges’ courtroom behavior and perspectives in three 
U.S. jurisdictions while holding the law, in effect, constant.26 The study focuses on a 
single area of law that varies relatively little across jurisdictions – protective orders – 
and includes 200 hours of live court observation, hand-collected transcripts of 357 
hearings where at least one person lacked counsel, and interviews with observed 
judges.27 With these data, we consider how geographic, political, and demographic 
variations across jurisdictions – as well as in their purported levels of commitment to 
ethics rules reform and judicial training – may or may not contribute to inter-
jurisdictional differences in judicial behavior.  
 
We expected to find significant differences in judges’ behavior across study 
sites based on jurisdictional differences in formal law and guidance and the effects of 
judicial discretion in state civil trial courts. Instead, we found surprising homogeneity 
and a shared approach characterized not by simplicity and accommodation but by 
complexity and control. Judges maintained legal and procedural complexity in their 
courtrooms by offering only the most limited explanations of court procedures and 
legal terms and refusing to answer litigants’ questions. Judges exercised control by 
tightly managing evidence presentation, relying heavily on petitioners’ pleadings to 
shape fact development, and limiting the evidence they were willing to hear from either 
party, particularly from defendants.  
 
Drawing on our data, we provide possible explanations for these results. 
Explanations include judges’ self-reported confusion about ethical boundaries and 
assumptions about judges’ traditional role in adversarial litigation, the pressure judges 
 
25 Our assessment of each jurisdiction is based on our own original research, which we describe in Part 
II, as well as aggregating sources, such as the Justice Index, which ranks states’ access to justice reform 
efforts, including reform of the judicial role. See, e.g., State Scores and Rankings, JUSTICE INDEX, 
https://perma.cc/VB3L-PNP3 (last visited July 7, 2021). 
26 For a detailed discussion of this study’s design and methodology, see Part II infra. To protect the 
confidentiality of study sites and research subjects, this Article reports no identifying information about 
the three jurisdictions, which we call Centerville, Townville, and Plainville. We describe the jurisdictions 
in Part II(A) infra.   
27 For more about protective orders cases and law see Part II (B) infra.  




face to clear cases in crowded dockets, and pre-hearing case development assistance 
that court-connected nonprofit organizations offer to petitioners only. These results 
suggest that judicial role reform, currently a widely accepted access to justice 
intervention, is not being implemented in the way its proponents envision. The courts 
in this study may have been lawyerless, but they were still fundamentally lawyer-centric.  
 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the evolution of judicial role 
reform over the past few decades, including the formal law and judicial ethics rules 
governing judges’ interactions with unrepresented litigants. This Part offers a novel 
categorization of state-level judicial ethics rules related to pro se assistance that shows 
ethics rules are either silent, permit such assistance, or encourage it. Part I also 
summarizes a body of advisory materials on role reform developed by scholars, courts, 
and access to justice think tanks. This guidance asks judges to help pro se parties in two 
key ways: offering explanations and information about legal standards, procedures, 
and technical terms and developing a full factual record through party testimony and 
judicial questioning. Part II presents our research design and methods and describes 
the cases and jurisdictions in the study sample. Importantly, this Part describes why 
understanding judicial behavior in civil trial courts requires a methodological approach 
specifically designed for a setting where live, in-person interactions between judges 
and litigants are common, written records are sparse or non-existent, and appeals are 
vanishingly rare. Part III presents the results of our study. Here, we draw on interviews 
and court observations to analyze how judges across jurisdictions maintained legal and 
procedural complexity and tightly controlled case presentation in the lawyerless courts 
where they preside. In Part IV, we discuss three possible factors that might shape 
behavior we observed: judges’ ethical confusion and traditional assumptions, docket 
pressure, and robust pre-hearing assistance that court-connected nonprofit 
organizations provide to only one party. The Article concludes by theorizing that the 
judicial role failure this study reveals is one of many signs of the core structural flaw 
in state civil courts: these institutions were designed for lawyer-driven adversarial 
dispute resolution and not for unrepresented users untrained in law who are managing 
a range of complex social, economic, and interpersonal challenges. 
 
I. JUDICIAL ROLE REFORM  
 
In this Part, we offer historical, conceptual, and legal context for the changing 
judicial role in lawyerless courts. We first briefly review the history of scholarship and 
expert commentary advocating for a changed judicial role as an access to justice 
intervention. We show how, for more than twenty years, legal scholars, judicial and 
court associations, court administrators, and other civil justice stakeholders have called 
for judges to let go of the traditional, passive judicial stance and actively assist people 
without counsel.   
 




Second, we survey the status of formal law, including ethics rules, on the 
judicial role in lawyerless courts and find that judges are generally authorized to 
accommodate and assist pro se litigants in limited ways. However, formal law remains 
largely silent on the appropriate scope and depth of judicial interventions. Case law in 
this area is notably underdeveloped and sometimes contradictory. Reported cases 
include admonitions for judges to adhere to traditional roles while also carving out 
ambiguous terrain within which judges can make discretionary accommodations for 
pro se parties. Based on a national review of judicial ethics rules, we categorize states’ 
judicial canons as taking one of three approaches to judicial assistance for pro se 
litigants: silence, permission, or encouragement. 
 
Third, we review guidance on judging in lawyerless courts developed by 
scholars, state court systems, and non-profit access to justice organizations. We find 
that a significant body of informal, advisory guidance stands in the gulf between strong 
scholarly support for judicial role reform and anemic formal law, offering judges 
suggestions about how to perform their roles in lawyerless courts. In the past five 
years, the production of such guidance by state court administrative bodies and think-
tanks has accelerated, reflecting a growing conventional wisdom that reforming the 
judicial role is a key access to justice intervention. Drawing on this guidance, we surface 
two core features of the role reform vision. First, judges are encouraged to offer 
transparent, accessible explanations of law and procedure throughout the litigation 
process. Second, judges are urged to elicit information, including narrative testimony, 
to build the factual record and ensure parties are fully heard. Ultimately, however, 
without formal law and ethical principles that require reform, individual judges are left 
with near-complete discretion and responsibility to implement this new role.  
 




A. CALLS FOR REFORM 
 
More than twenty years ago, when rates of pro se litigation were on the rise, 
legal scholars began calling for and describing a new judicial role in trial courts.28 Since 
then, civil trial courts have become lawyerless. Legal scholars concerned with access 
to justice have consistently argued for an end to traditional judicial passivity in favor 
of an active, interventionist role in lawyerless cases.29 Many supporters have praised 
role reform as an efficient and pragmatic access to justice intervention.30 Most scholars 
speaking on this topic have advocated for retraining, guidance, and voluntary action 
by individual judges, including encouraging judges to ask questions, offer information, 
and adjust procedural rules. At least two commentators have pushed for a mandatory 
approach that requires judges to offer certain types of assistance.31 Today, the 
permissive, voluntary approach prevails.  
 
Criticisms of the traditional, passive judicial role in pro se cases appeared in legal 
scholarship in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. At that time, formal law, including 
judicial ethics rules, generally required judges to be “impartial” in their interactions 
with all parties, with the underlying assumption that most parties would be 
 
28 Early work includes: JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET. AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE 
LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998) [hereinafter 
GOLDSCHMIDT, MEETING THE CHALLENGE]; RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT: 
DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS (2002) [hereinafter 
ZORZA, SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT] (suggesting how to design a court for pro se litigants); Jona 
Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 
40 FAM. CT. REV. 36 (2002) (discussing judicial resistance to assistance for pro se litigants and asserting 
judicial obligations to provide assistance) [hereinafter Goldschmidt, Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle]; Rebecca 
A. Albrecht, John M. Greacen, Bonnie Rose Hough & Richard Zorza, Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving 
Self-Represented Litigants, 42 JUDGES’ J. 16 (2003) (calling for judicial role reform and proposing best 
practices); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never 
Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004); Richard 
Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality 
when Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
423 (2004) [hereinafter Zorza, The Disconnect] (arguing judicial assistance to pro se parties is consistent 
with impartiality and fairness). See also Jane Spinak, Judicial Leadership in Family Court: A Cautionary Tale, 
10 TENN. J. L.& POL’Y 47 (2014) (discussing the current trends toward judicial problem solving roles in 
family court, and their historical antecedents). 
29 More recent work includes: Barton, Against Civil Gideon, supra note 12 (arguing an active role for judges 
is a key solution to the crisis facing state trial courts); Barton & Bibas, supra note 12, at 985 (arguing for 
pro se court reform, including judicial assistance, rather than civil Gideon); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial 
Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. L.  REV. 325 (2010) (charging judges with 
the responsibility to modify rigid roles); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: 
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999) [hereinafter Engler, 
And Justice for All] (calling for judicial intervention and assistance as a key element of access to justice 
court reform); Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y, 367, 368, 376 (2008) [hereinafter Engler, Ethics in Transition]; 
Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869 (2009) (asserting that 
closing the justice gap calls for concerted efforts from all stakeholders, including courts, and calling for 
pro se court reform); Steinberg, Demand Side Reform, supra note 8. 
30 See infra Part I(a). Cf. Kathryn Sabbeth, supra note 8 (arguing against remaking the courts via 
simplification reforms). 
31 Id. 




represented. Until 2010, judicial canons were silent about judicial behavior in pro se 
cases.32 Thus, early critics of judicial passivity focused on arguing that judges could, as 
a matter of ethics, actively engage with litigants—such as asking questions to develop 
the record or explaining a procedural step—while still maintaining their impartiality 
and neutrality under then-existing ethical rules.33 
 
One of the first legal scholars to advocate for changes to the judge’s role, 
Russell Engler, began writing on the topic as early as 1999. Engler’s seminal work 
highlighted the then-increasing rates of unrepresented people in state courts, 
articulated the challenges they faced in navigating court processes and argued that 
judges, with the support of ethical guidance and retraining, could offer assistance and 
support to those without counsel.34 Engler documented uncertainty among judges and 
other court staff about the permissible boundaries for their interactions with 
unrepresented people and noted the lack of guidelines to help judges “redefine” their 
roles.35 He emphasized that, at the time, many trial judges assumed that appearing in 
court without counsel was a rational, considered choice as opposed to something 
forced upon some litigants by the unavailability or unaffordability of legal assistance.36 
As a result, some judges believed that people without counsel should “live with the 
consequences” of their decisions.37 However, Engler also documented signs of shifts 
in judicial attitudes, including directives from some state courts instructing their trial 
judges to “set up different procedures” in pro se cases.38  
 
In response to these dynamics, Engler and others writing at the time argued 
that being impartial does not inherently require judges to be passive.39 Engler 
suggested that judicial assistance for people without counsel in trial courts could be 
modeled after the practices of small claims and administrative judges who, at the time, 
were more commonly expected to deal with unrepresented people and help them 
advance their cases while also maintaining impartiality.40 Ultimately, Engler’s work 
asserted that judges could and should assist unrepresented people in a range of ways, 
including developing facts, identifying claims and defenses, assessing what sort of 
assistance or information the litigant might have received prior to coming to the 
 
32 Id.; see also Engler, Ethics in Transition, supra note 25, at 370. 
33 See supra note 24; Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 25, at 2028 (noting unrepresented people are 
“forced to make choices at every turn without understanding either the range of options available or 
the pros and cons of each option”).  
34 Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 25, at 1988. 
35 Id. at 1991. 
36 Id. at 1988–89. 
37 Id. at 1998. 
38 Engler, Ethics in Transition, supra note 25, at 372–73. 
39 GOLDSCHMIDT, MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 24; ZORZA, SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT; 
supra note 24; Goldschmidt, Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle, supra note 24; Albrecht, Greacen, Hough, & Zorza, 
supra note 24; Zorza, The Disconnect, supra note 24. 
40 Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 25, at 2017–2019, 2028–29 (“Far from offending notions of 
impartiality, the call for judges to provide vigorous assistance to unrepresented litigants is consistent 
with the need for impartiality.”). 




courtroom, and correcting any misunderstandings, particularly in the context of 
settlement agreements with a represented opposing party.41  
 
Following Engler’s early work, Deborah Rhode’s seminal book, Access to Justice, 
was published in 2004 and sparked a broader conversation about the growth of pro se 
parties in state courts, the lack of legal assistance for the public more broadly, and the 
legal profession’s responsibility for these systemic challenges.42 Russell Pearce 
explicitly cited Rhode’s book as the inspiration for his argument that judges should be 
affirmatively required to assist unrepresented people, particularly by ensuring that 
procedural errors do not block people without counsel from presenting relevant 
evidence and arguments.43 In Pearce’s words, the “paradigm of judge as passive 
umpire” should be replaced with the “paradigm of judge as active umpire.”44  
 
Around the same time, Richard Zorza, scholar and founder of the Self-
Represented Litigation Network (a clearinghouse for access to civil justice best 
practices), wrote a series of papers calling for judges to take an active role in cases 
involving unrepresented people.45 Zorza emphasized the importance of transparency 
and judicial “engagement” with parties and detailed the downsides of judicial passivity 
with a strong emphasis on the risk that party confusion, intimidation, or lack of 
understanding would result in judges missing the chance to hear relevant evidence or 
legal arguments. Zorza, like others writing at the time, also argued that passive judging 
created risks for courts as institutions, potentially threatening their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public.46 To minimize risks to substantive justice and court legitimacy, 
Zorza asserted that judges should explain legal standards and the steps of the litigation 
process, regularly confirm understanding with litigants, ask questions of litigants to 
elicit relevant facts, and clearly explain the judge’s decision and its consequences.47 
 
41 Id. 
Judges should conduct trials in the manner “best suited to discover the facts 
and do justice in the case.”  “In an effort to…secur[e] substantial justice,” the court 
must assist the unrepresented litigant on procedure to be followed, presentation of 
evidence, and questions of law. Further, the court may call witnesses and conduct 
direct or cross examinations. The court has a “basic obligation to develop a full and 
fair record…” Each of these duties is not only wholly consistent with the notion of 
impartiality, but also necessary for the system to maintain its impartiality. 
 
Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 25, at 2028–30 (internal citations omitted) (citing Mass. Unif. Sm. 
Cl. R. 7(c); Fla. Ct. Sm. Cl. R. 7.140(e); Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 286(b); Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human 
Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting McConnell v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 604, 606 (5th 
Cir. 1981))). 
42 DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). 
43 Pearce, supra note 24, at 970–72. 
44 Id. at 970. 
45 See Zorza, The Disconnect, supra note 24, at 426–31; ZORZA, SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT, supra note 
24, at 109–114; Richard Zorza, Courts in the 21st Century: The Access to Justice Transformation, 49 JUDGES J. 
14 (2010) [hereinafter Zorza, 21st Century]. 
46 See Zorza, The Disconnect, supra note 24, at 438–39. 
47 Id.; Zorza, 21st Century, supra note 41, at 4. 




In a paper comparing the possibility of pro se court reform to the alternative of 
a legal right to counsel for all civil litigants, Benjamin Barton called for retraining 
judges to assist people without counsel and asked readers to “imagine a world where 
the courts that deal with the poor are so simple, efficient, transparent, and pleasant 
that for once the justice system of the poor was the envy of the rich. Pro se court reform 
actually offers this possibility.”48 Barton criticized calls for an expanded right to 
counsel in civil cases, comparing the promise of “civil Gideon” to the pragmatic reality 
of how the right to counsel operates in the criminal context and argued that the need 
for lawyers in civil courts could be eliminated in the first place if those courts became 
systematically more accessible to people without counsel, including through a re-
thinking of the judicial role.49 Barton also asserted the pragmatic value of judicial role 
reform, a view that other scholars and advocates for role reform share.50 As the 
National Center for State Courts states in its Justice for All Initiative Guidance 
Materials, “It is more effective to train one judge on how to assist a self-represented 
litigant than to teach hundreds of SRLs how to be lawyers.”51 
 
A more recent proposal advanced by one of the authors of this Article, Jessica 
Steinberg, makes a more expansive argument about the type of judicial role reform 
needed to solve the crisis of lawyerless courts.52 Steinberg’s ambitious proposal calls 
for fundamental changes to the judges’ role and judicial ethics but, critically, also for 
removing the norm of party-driven litigation in civil courts. Drawing on the model of 
Social Security Administration disability claim adjudication, where judges have 
affirmative case development duties, Steinberg proposes a new set of procedural and 
evidentiary rules that require courts and judges to bear the burden of moving cases 
through the litigation process, including providing form pleadings, serving process, 
scheduling hearings, developing the factual record, raising potential legal claims, and 
drafting orders.53 To date, courts have not created affirmative requirements of judicial 
assistance in civil trial courts such as those advocated by Pearce and Steinberg. 
 
B. UNDERDEVELOPED FORMAL LAW  
 
Today, formal law, including case law and judicial ethics, tends to be vague and 
underdeveloped and is sometimes contradictory. In this section, we briefly review the 
state of the law, categorize three different approaches found in states judicial ethics 
rules related to judicial assistance for people without counsel – silence, permission, or 
encouragement – and conclude that formal law generally offers judges little purchase 
 
48 Barton, Against Civil Gideon, supra note 12, at 1228, 1273. 
49 See id. at 1227–28, 1233–34 (“If a systematic effort were made to simplify the law and procedure in 
courts with large pro se dockets, it could improve outcomes in those courts and do more for the poor 
than a guarantee of counsel, all at less cost.”). 
50 See e.g., id.; Barton & Bibas, supra note 12.  
51 See e.g., JUSTICE FOR ALL MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 32. 
52 See generally Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13. 
53 See id. at 947–965. 




in understanding what they should and should not be doing in their interactions with 
unrepresented people.  
 
Early advocates of judicial role reform developed persuasive arguments that 
judges who affirmatively accommodated and assisted pro se litigants by asking 
questions, explaining legal standards, or modifying procedural rules, for example, were 
not violating ethical duties of impartiality and neutrality.54 Such arguments, along with 
the pragmatic reality of the growing pro se crisis, influenced the American Bar 
Association (ABA) and many states to alter judicial ethics rules to reflect this new 
understanding of the legally permissible scope of judicial assistance.  
 
In 2010, the ABA modified Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2 to 
explicitly permit judges to make “reasonable accommodations” for unrepresented 
people, clarifying that doing so is not a violation of the duty of impartiality. Rule 2.2 
states, “A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial 
office fairly and impartially.” The revision appears in Comment 4 to Rule 2.2: “It is 
not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure 
pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.”55 Many states, 
though not all, have followed suit.  
 
Our review of judicial canons from all 50 states and the District of Columbia 
shows states have taken one of three approaches in the context of judicial assistance 
for people without counsel: silence, permission, or encouragement.56 No state 
currently requires judicial assistance for people without counsel. Fifteen states have 
taken the approach we label “silence.” In these states, judicial ethics rules or comments 
to the rules have not been amended to add any language clarifying that assisting or 
accommodating people without counsel is not a violation of a judge’s duty of 
impartiality. A majority of states, 30, have followed the formula laid out by the ABA’s 
amendments to Rule 2.2 and added language clarifying that “reasonable 
accommodations” do not violate impartiality. We call this approach “permission.” 
Finally, eight states, including one of those in our study, have adopted ethical rules that 
go a step farther and urge judges to consider offering accommodations and assistance 
 
54 See Engler, Ethics in Transition, supra note 25, at 372–73; see also Zorza, supra note 24; CYNTHIA GRAY, 
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, REACHING OUT OR OVERREACHING: JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2005) (argues active judging practices do not violate ethics or compromise 
the impartiality). 
55 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). Also in 2010, the ABA also revised 
Rule 2.6, which states, “A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, 
or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.” The update appears in Comment 2 and 
states, “Among the factors that a judge should consider when deciding upon an appropriate settlement 
practice for a case are…whether the parties and their counsel are relatively sophisticated in legal 
matters….[or] whether any parties are unrepresented by counsel…” MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 
r. 2.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
56 Data on file with authors.  




by outlining specific actions a judge may take and explicitly urging judges to consider 
taking such actions.57 We label this approach “encouraging.” 
 
While most jurisdictions now explicitly permit judges to accommodate pro se 
litigants, formal law largely leaves the task of operationalizing this role up to individual 
trial judges. Appellate opinions discussing pro se assistance are limited, insufficient, and 
often contradictory, particularly considering the massive numbers of civil cases and 
trial court work that touches unrepresented parties.58 A recent analysis found that 
appellate courts “often issue opinions laden with stock language advising judges to 
adhere to adversary procedure but also to ensure substantive justice is achieved,” but 
without instruction on how to strike this balance in practice.59 Courts consistently 
decline to require judges to affirmatively assist pro se parties and often make a point of 
explicitly stating that judges have no such duty.60 The most common framework that 
emerges from case law around the country has two components. First, pro se litigants 
are held to the same procedural and evidentiary standards as lawyers. Second, trial 
judges may, in some circumstances, waive or explain technical requirements, liberally 
construe pleadings, or give multiple opportunities to amend where such steps would 
not affect substantive justice or violate due process.61  
 
 
57 The jurisdiction in this study that has adopted “encouraging” ethical rules is Centerville, as we describe 
in greater detail in Part II(a) infra. Here’s an example of such language from Maine: 
 
A judge may take affirmative steps, consistent with the law, as the judge deems 
appropriate to enable an unrepresented litigant to be heard. A judge may explain the 
requirements of applicable rules and statutes so that a person appearing before the 
judge understands the process to be employed. A judge may also inform 
unrepresented individuals of free or reduced cost legal or other assistance that is 
available in the courthouse or elsewhere. 
 
Me. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.6(C). 
58 Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13, at 904. This dearth of appellate treatment is related to a 
topic of the authors’ future work: the phenomenon of generally limited law development in substantive 
legal areas with pro se majorities.  
59 Id. 
60 See e.g., Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (N.H. 1979); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 
1968); Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987); see also Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13, 
at 927 (citing Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), as “an example of 
the courts’ emphasis on the norm of party control,” where parties are expected to act like lawyers). The 
California Judicial Council offers this summary of California appellate cases on unrepresented litigant 
assistance: 
 
The trial judge has broad discretion to adjust procedures to make sure a self-
represented litigant is heard; 2. Judges will always be affirmed if they make these 
adjustments without prejudicing the rights of the opposing party to have the case 
decided on the facts and the law. 3. Judges will usually be affirmed if they refuse to 
make a specific adjustment, unless such refusal is manifestly unreasonable and unfair. 
 
JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., HANDLING CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 3–12 (2019). 
61 Id. 




As a matter of law, it is clear that American civil trial judges generally have the 
discretion to accommodate and assist pro se litigants, including waiving procedural 
technicalities if they choose. In most jurisdictions, formal law offers little beyond this 
broad and vague authorization. As a result, most judges cannot look to formal law to 
identify the permissible bounds of any assistance they might offer. In the absence of 
formal law to guide individual judge behavior, civil justice reform experts, think tanks, 
and court administrative bodies have developed informal guidance aimed at shaping 
judges’ behavior.   
 
C. GUIDANCE FOR JUDGES 
 
As trial judges have wrestled with the challenge of pro se majorities filling their 
courtrooms – and absent much guidance from formal law – scholars, courts, judges, 
and other experts have produced a large body of guidance, best practices, and training 
materials aimed at shaping and influencing judges’ behavior. Sources include the 
Conference of Chief Justices, state supreme courts, judicial leaders,62 legal scholars, 
and think tanks such as the National Center for State Courts and the Self-Represented 
Litigation Network.63 Over the past few decades, such sources have issued a range of 
 
62 See e.g., CIV. JUST. IMPROVEMENTS COMM., CONF. OF CHIEF JUDGES’, CALL TO ACTION: ACHIEVING 
CIVIL JUSTICE FOR ALL 16–18, 34 (2016), https://perma.cc/5UJS-PAQZ; JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra 
note 56; MONT. JUDGES’ DESKBOOK FOR MUN., JUST., & CITY CTS. 5 (John H. Duehr, ed., 2010), 
https://perma.cc/TXN6-B6N4; COMM. ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION, NEB. SUP. CT., 
STRATEGIC PLAN 2015–2020, at 11 (2015), https://perma.cc/F8T5-U7BZ; N.M. JUD. EDUC. CTR., 
UNIV. N.M. SCH. LAW, N.M. JUD. ETHICS HANDBOOK 49 (2011), https://perma.cc/8DLD-RAHP; 
MICH. BENCHBOOK (2020); MICH. JUD. INST., CIV. PROC. BENCHBOOK (2d ed., 2020),  
https://perma.cc/Q9VR-QDFQ; ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, TENN. SUP. CT., MEETING CHALLENGES 
OF SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: A BENCH BOOK FOR GEN. SESSIONS JUDGES’ OF ST. OF TENN. 2, 
6–12 (2013), https://perma.cc/WC9S-LWQW; BENCHBOOK COMM., ASS’N DIST. CT. JUDGES’ VA., 
DIST. CT. JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK 159–165 (2019), https://perma.cc/95VM-CRWY; ADVISORY GRP. 
SELF-REPRESENTATION N.J. COURTS, ENSURING AN OPEN DOOR TO JUSTICE: SOLUTIONS FOR 
ENHANCING ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 14, 31, 53–54 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/FN7R-LXSK; COLO. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, JUST. CRISIS IN COLO. 2014: 
REPORT ON CIV. LEGAL NEEDS IN COLO. 26 (2014), https://perma.cc/K7C2-UMFD; KATHERINE 
ALTENEDER, EDUARDO GONZALES & FLA. COMM’N ON ACCESS TO CIV. JUST., LEARNING FROM SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND THEIR TRUSTED INTERMEDIARIES 10–11 (2020),  
https://perma.cc/EM7X-UU42; ILL. JUD. BRANCH, BENCH CARD: SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS & 
SCR 63(A)(4) (2019), https://perma.cc/FTT3-HTPB; MASS., JUD. GUIDELINES FOR CIV. HEARINGS 
INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (WITH COMMENTARY) 1–3 (2019), 
https://perma.cc/SUL4-WG2W.  
63 See e.g., SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES IN COURT-BASED PROGRAMS FOR 
THE SELF-REPRESENTED: CONCEPTS, ATTRIBUTES, ISSUES FOR EXPLORATION, EXAMPLES, 
CONTACTS, AND RESOURCES (2D ED. 2008) [hereinafter SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST 
PRACTICES], https://perma.cc/U3RF-4WP7; JOHN M. GREACEN & MICHAEL HOULBERG, ENSURING 
RIGHT TO BE HEARD: GUIDANCE FOR TRIAL JUDGES IN CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED 
LITIGANTS (2019), https://perma.cc/9VBX-NAR7; JUSTICE FOR ALL MATERIALS, supra note 12. The 
Self-Represented Litigation Network, the National Center for State Courts, and the American Judicature 
Society collaborated to develop curricula to train judges in best practices for handled pro se cases. See 
Nat’l. Ctr. St. Cts., Curriculum: Access to Justice for the Self-Represented, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. 
NETWORK (2013), https://perma.cc/M4B7-BW3V [hereinafter 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice]; 
see also Curricula on Access to Justice for the Self-Represented at the Access to Justice for the Self-




articles, reports, bench guides, and training materials that recommend and define an 
accommodating, helpful, and interventionist role for judges in lawyerless courts. 
 
 This section reviews existing guidance and draws out two cross-cutting 
recommendations for how judges should alter traditional passivity and adversary 
procedures in pro se hearings.64 First, guidance materials instruct judges to offer 
information and explanations to help pro se litigants understand the law, court process, 
and legal terms. Second, guidance emphasizes a judge’s role in ensuring parties have 
their matters fairly and fully heard and urges judges to actively elicit factual information 
during hearings to develop a complete record.  
 
1. Offering Information and Explanations 
 
According to guidance literature, one of the most critical roles a judge plays in 
cases without lawyers involves promoting transparency through information-sharing 
and explanations.65 The need for explanations is obvious from the perspective of an 
unrepresented person: most people do not have legal training and likely will not know 
what facts might be relevant, what legal claims they can assert, how to introduce 
evidence, or the procedural posture of a case.66 In addition, as guidance from 
California notes, legal language is a “foreign language” for most people.67  
 
 
Represented Conference at Harvard Law School, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK (Nov. 2007), 
https://perma.cc/T6UT-N4C5 [hereinafter 2007 Curricula]. 
64 See Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 3 (reviewing guidance and identifying a range 
of possible judicial behavior, including explaining, eliciting, adjusting procedures, referring to litigants 
to resources, and facilitating negotiation); Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13 (discussing 
judges adjusting procedures and raising legal issues); Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra 
note 13 (discussing eliciting, explaining, and adjusting procedures). 
65 See Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13, at 931; Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 
supra note 13, at 660–70; see e.g., ILL. JUD. BRANCH, BENCH CARD, supra note 58, at 1; 2013 Curriculum 
on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module D; JUSTICE FOR ALL MATERIALS, supra note 12, at 32; 
Richard Zorza, A New Day for Judges and the Self-Represented: The Implications of Turner v. Rogers, 4 JUDGES’ 
J. 16, 17–18 (2011) [hereinafter Zorza, A New Day]; GREACEN & HOULBERG, supra note 59, at 14; JUD. 
COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56, at 2–3; COLO. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, JUSTICE CRISIS, supra note 
58. 
 
Throughout the process, the judge should have in place proactive processes to make 
sure that the parties do understand what is going on and why. This should include 
asking if they understand, and seeking confirmation of understanding at critical 
points. 
 
Zorza, The Disconnect, supra note 24, at 443. For a robust discussion of how people without lawyers 
engage with legal information, see generally, David J. Greiner, Dalie Jimenez, and Lois Lupica, Self-Help 
Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119 (2017).   
66 See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, supra note 59, at Module A, slide 4. 
67 JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56. In fact, California’s guide notes that legal terms are, quite 
literally, sometimes a “mash-up” of foreign languages including Latin and French. 




From a court or judge’s perspective, guidance materials offer three common 
reasons why judges should serve in an explanatory role. First, a litigant who 
understands the legal standards, procedural steps, and court processes will, in turn, be 
more helpful to the judge, for example, by offering facts that help the judge render a 
decision. Second, psychological research on the concept of procedural justice research 
suggests parties who believe they understand the reasons for a judge’s decision will be 
more likely to accept and follow the decision.68 And third, a number of guidance 
sources stress that courts, as institutions, should be articulating the reasons for their 
decisions systematically to the people who bring their problems to courts for 
resolution, a principle also rooted in procedural justice research, which suggests that 
people are more likely to perceive courts and their decisions as legitimate when they 
understand the bases of those decisions.69 
 
With these goals in mind, guidance pushes judges to take responsibility for 
explaining a wide range of information and confirming that litigants understand the 
information the judge has attempted to convey.70 Judges are encouraged to offer clear, 
accessible explanations of court processes and procedures (such as the order of trial 
or how evidence should be offered), legal information (such as what elements must be 
proven in a case), and language (including translating legal terms and avoiding the use 
of jargon in the first place).71  
 
Guidance materials suggest judges offer information at the beginning of a 
docket to explain the process litigants can expect, such as why a judge might hear 
certain cases first.72 Judges are also encouraged to begin every hearing with a brief 
statement of the purpose of the hearing, the process that will be followed, and the 
legal issues that will be heard or decided.73 During hearings, judges are instructed to 
explain the applicable law or legal standards when needed and offer sufficient 
explanations to help litigants understand what kind of factual information the court 
needs to render a decision, such as explaining why a judge might need testimony on 
 
68 Id. at 6–19 (“Judges have wide discretion to admit or reject evidence in cases involving self-
represented litigants, but should explain their thought process to the parties to maintain a sense of 
fairness.”). As a number of sources note, research 7suggests that perceptions of a decisionmaker’s 
trustworthiness are directly tied to whether a judge can justify, via explanation, the decisions she makes. 
See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, supra note 59, at Module A, slide 15; see also Tom Tyler, 
Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCH. 117, 122 (2010); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY 
THE LAW (2006).  
69 SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES, supra note 59; GREACEN & HOULBERG, 
supra note 59. 
70 For examples, see Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 
44 CT. REV. 4, 18 (2007) [hereinafter Burke & Leben, Procedural Fairness]; 2013 Curriculum on Access to 
Justice, Supra note 59, at Module A, slide 7. 
71 See e.g., SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES supra note 59, at 54. 
72 Id. at 54. 
73 See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module B, slide 6. 




an issue.74 At the end of hearings, judges are urged to explain the content, meaning, 
and enforcement process of court orders.75 
 
2. Fully Developing the Factual Record  
 
According to guidance materials, judges should actively elicit facts from 
litigants to ensure a complete factual record and accurate legal decisions while 
increasing the likelihood that litigants perceive the court has heard them.76 
Recommended behavior includes asking “neutral” questions to develop facts, listening 
patiently to narrative testimony, modifying evidentiary and procedural rules to ensure 
relevant evidence is introduced.77 Pro se guidance stresses the importance of this role 
because judges need legally relevant facts to render decisions. Getting such 
information in hearings involving unrepresented people is a persistent challenge given 
that litigants may have only a loose sense of what matters under the law and a strong 
sense of what matters in their own lives.  
 
State courts systems tend to offer general guidance that judges may ask 
questions and adjust hearing procedures to elicit information but vary in the strength 
of their recommendations that judges actively intervene. Montana and California 
exemplify two approaches. Official guidance in Montana pushes judges to intervene 
as little as possible, stepping in only when necessary to clarify testimony, while 
California encourages judges actively to elicit information and ask questions.78  
 
 
74 SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES, supra note 59, at 54; JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., 
supra note 56, at 2–7. 
75 For examples, see e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 59, at 8 (“At the hearing, the judge grants 
[the] emergency protective order and explains the consequences of it as well as possible next steps [the 
litigant] might take to ensure her family’s safety.”); Burke & Leben, Procedural Fairness, supra note 66, at 
18. 
76 See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module B, slide 8; JUD. COUNCIL OF 
CAL., supra note 56, at 50–53; ILL. JUD. BRANCH, BENCH CARD, supra note 58; MASS., JUDICIAL 
GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, supra note 58; COLO. 
ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, JUSTICE CRISIS, supra note 58. 
77 See e.g. MASS., JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED 
LITIGANTS, supra note 58; 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, Supra note 59, at Module A, slide 7; 
SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES, supra note 59, at 54, 59; Zorza, A New Day, 
supra note 61, at 17–18; GREACEN & HOULBERG, supra note 59, at 14. 
 
To decide cases fairly, judges need facts, and to get those facts, judges often have to 
ask questions, modify procedure, and apply their common sense in the courtroom 
to create an environment in which all the relevant facts are brought out. Without a 
full understanding of the facts, judicial officers are at risk to either mis-apply the 
applicable law or apply the wrong law. 
 
JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56, at 2-2. 
78 See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56; MONT. JUDGES’ DESKBOOK, supra note 58. 




Guidance language encouraging judges to help litigants develop the factual 
record is typically stated in broad terms.79 For example, one judicial training curriculum 
urges judges to “…focus on what the litigants need,” which typically is “a process in 
which they feel the courts are engaged and in which they can tell their stories 
in meaningful ways.”80 The curriculum goes on to say, “Active listening by the court 
assists in building the confidence of the litigants and permits the court to guide the 
proceedings without the litigants feeling frustrated by being limited in their 
presentations.”81 Most guidance materials steer clear of offering granular protocols, 
substantive legal context, or step-by-step recommendations.82 
 
Yet, all of this guidance is merely advisory. Absent more detailed, context-
specific advice or clear legal standards, let alone an affirmative obligation to assist pro 
se litigants in some way, individual judges ultimately have vast responsibility and 
discretion in operationalizing reforms to the traditional, passive role. Many guidance 
sources explicitly note judges’ vast discretion in determining how best to interact with 
unrepresented people, and some even take pains to assure judges that they can reject 
 
79 The following language comes from a two-page “Bench Card” from Illinois. The document offers a 
paragraph expanding on each of the points below: 
 
Tips for ensuring SRLs are fairly heard: 1. Use simple, plain language; avoid legal 
jargon; and explain legal concepts. 2. Explain overall court processes (including 
evidentiary and foundational requirements) and what will happen in court. 3. Ask the 
SRL what questions they have and check for understanding throughout proceedings. 
4. Liberally construe pleadings: look to the substance of a pleading rather than its 
title.5. Ask neutral questions for clarification or to focus the proceedings and 
consider modifying the traditional order of taking evidence.6. Explain why you are 
doing something and your basis for rulings. 7. Recognize that most SRLs may be 
scared and nervous.8. Be courteous, patient, and an active listener to ease tension. 9. 
Remember procedural fairness principles: voice, neutrality, respect, trust, 
understanding, and helpfulness. 10. Appreciate your unconscious biases and increase 
cultural competencies. 11. Use certified interpreters for limited English proficient or 
hearing impaired litigants. 12. Provide SRLs with checklists, handouts, and other 
resources or referrals. 
 
ILL. JUD. BRANCH, BENCH CARD, supra note 58. A statewide guide to handling pro se cases developed by 
the Judicial Council of California and released in 2019 is an exception and stands out among all the 
guidance documents we reviewed as by far the most comprehensive and detailed, clocking in at 280 
pages. The first four chapters address judges’ behavior in evidentiary hearings, one chapter reviews 
California appellate decisions related to pro se assistance, another chapter explains the implications of 
procedural justice research, and another suggests a range of courtroom and hearing management 
techniques, including sample scripts for a range of situations. This guide offers more in-depth 
information about the challenges pro se litigants face when compared to other states. It also offers many 
more concrete steps judges can take, such as check-in procedures, organizing the order in which cases 
are called, clustering issues during evidentiary hearings, outlining which legal issues the court will be 
deciding in a hearing, and explaining which party has the burden of proof for each hearing. However, 
it is an open question whether this level of guidance, absent formal legal requirements for judges to help 
pro se litigants, will alter judges’ approach. See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56. 
80 2007 Curricula, supra note 59, at Curriculum 2, slide 6. 
81 Id. 
82 California is an exception in offering more detailed guidance. See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 
56. 




any suggestions that make them “uncomfortable.”83 Some sources seem to 
acknowledge where recommendations will inevitably fall short. For example, one 
judicial training curriculum presents “Ten Key Techniques” for pro se cases, but before 
listing the techniques, includes this caveat:  
 
Every case is different, and every litigant is different. In a particular 
case, some techniques may apply, some may not, and others may need 
modifying….The techniques are offered as tools to judges, not explicit 
directions. Every judge has to develop his or her style.84 
 
As this section has shown, the backdrop of this study is one of formal law with 
general admonitions and limited requirements, informal guidance with more specific 
suggestions, and ultimately reliance on individual judicial behavior to improve access 
to justice in lawyerless courts. We turn next to the study itself. 
 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
This Part describes the study’s research design, including methods, data 
collection processes, and study sites.  
 
This study was designed to offer a theoretically driven and rigorous 
comparative description of how judges who preside in America’s lawyerless courts 
operationalize and conceive of their role, including whether and how they assist pro se 
litigants and implement role reform recommendations.85 We approached this empirical 
project by selecting study sites that allowed us to control substantive law effects while 
varying other contextual factors that may relate to how a jurisdiction’s judges behave. 
We considered factors including geographical area, political culture, court 
administrative structure, judicial ethics rules, availability of pro se training for judges, 
and other investments in civil justice infrastructure aimed at increasing access to 
justice, and we assessed how jurisdictions varied through a review of primary 
documents and aggregating sources. This approach allowed us to examine 
 
83 See e.g., 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, supra note 59, at Module B, slide 7, slide 14; JUD. 
COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56, at 2-2. 
84 2013 Curriculum on Access to Justice, supra note 59, at Module B, slide 7. The ten key techniques are: 
Frame the subject matter of the hearing. Explain the process that will be followed. Elicit needed 
information from litigants. Involve litigants in decision making. Articulate the decision from the bench. 
Explain the decision and summarize the terms of the order. Anticipate and resolve issues with 
compliance. Provide a written order at the close of the hearing. Set litigant expectations for next steps. 
Use nonverbal communication effectively. 
85 One self-published study by the Self-Represented Litigation Network and John Greacen offers 
some data on judicial behavior in pro se family law cases. However, the study design has important 
limitations worth noting. For example, the study included only fifteen hearings and the researchers 
chose to study only courts that had reputations for providing high-levels of assistance to pro se 
litigants, see Self-Represented Litigation Network and John Greacen, Effectiveness of Courtroom 
Communication in Hearings Missing “Involving Two Self-Represented Litigants: An Exploratory Study (2008), 
https://perma.cc/Q5EW-HVYR.   




environments where the universe of judicial behavior was constrained by relatively 
fixed legal structures while varying the level of guidance and support for judges actively 
providing pro se assistance.86  
 
Our methodological approach acknowledges that studying complex social 
phenomena requires researchers to describe and understand the conditions that 
underlie the phenomena they wish to analyze.87 To engage in this type of research 
process, we needed to diverge from the typical empirical approach to the study of 
judicial behavior in legal scholarship, which tends to rely on case outcomes and written 
opinions to explore the factors that might shape judges’ decisions in appellate cases.88 
While existing studies on judicial behavior provide valuable contributions to the 
scholarly understanding of how judges decide cases in appeals courts, the data such 
studies rely upon, and their resulting quantitative empirical approaches, cannot be a 
starting place for studying trial judges and their courts where written decisions are 
nearly non-existent and appeals are rare.89 Even if written decisions were widely 
available, our interest does not lie in predicting or explaining case outcomes but instead 
in examining the myriad within-case decisions judges make that primarily go 
unrecorded, such as whether to allow lengthy, narrative testimony or whether to ask 
questions to affirmatively develop the factual record. Understanding how judges are 
implementing their role and enforcing procedural rules in civil trials thus requires 
capturing judges’ live, in-person interactions with litigants, including contextual, 
environmental, and non-verbal information that a court transcript alone could not 
capture.  
 
In addition to the value of our novel descriptive effort, our approach also 
allows us to generate theoretical propositions about the causes and consequences of 
judicial behavior for future analytical research. Because civil trial courts lack lawyers to 
mediate and influence judge behavior, understanding judges’ within-case decisions 
about role implementation, procedure, and offers of assistance to pro se litigants is a 
critical contribution to the study of the factors which influence judicial behavior and 
 
86 See John Gerring & Lee Cojocaru, Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A Diversity of Goals and Methods, 
45 SOCIO.  METHODS & RSCH. 396, 397 (2016). 
87 87 See ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND METHODS (Naomi Creutzfeldt, 
Marc Mason & Kirsten McConnachie eds., Routledge 2019); Howard S. Erlanger, Bryant Garth, Jane 
E. Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse, and David B. Wilkins, Forward: Is it Time for a New Legal 
Realism? 2005 WISC. L. REV. 335, 345-346 (2005); Rebecca Sandefur, Access to Justice, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON MODERN LEGAL REALISM (Shauhin Talesh, Elizabeth Mertz, and Heinz Klug, eds., 
forthcoming). 
88 See Katerina Linos & Melissa Carlson, Qualitative Methods for Law Review Writing, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
213 (2017). 
89 See Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to 
Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1734; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 835 n.17 (2008); Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 3, at 265–
71. 




its consequences for litigants, case outcomes, the legitimacy of courts, and the rule of 
law.   
 
Given that our research questions focus on examining judicial behavior, we 
collected observational data from hearings and interview data and conversations with 
judges. Our study sample – eleven judges across three jurisdictions that vary in their 
level of guidance and support for pro se judicial assistance – facilitates comparisons of 
behaviors of interest at the judge and jurisdiction level.90 The jurisdictions include 
Centerville, a large, prosperous, coastal urban center; Townville, a small, economically 
depressed coastal city; and Plainville, a mid-size city located in the middle of the 
country.91 
 
To focus our comparative efforts, we sought to minimize the influence of 
factors that would interfere with our ability to discuss judges’ approaches across 
jurisdictions.  As such, we chose an area of law that varies relatively little from state to 
state in substantive law and process: protective orders for victims of intimate partner 
abuse and stalking. Further, in this area of law, most parties are unrepresented, and the 
cases require in-person testimony. Therefore, we gathered data on judges’ in-person 
interactions with pro se parties in an area of law that affords similar opportunities for 
judges to perform recommended behaviors and offer pro se assistance in dockets where 
unrepresented parties are the norm. We also sought to minimize the possibility that 
our sample would include judges who were systematically more likely than other judges 
to be outlier examples of poor or uncommon judicial behavior in lawyerless courts.92 
 
We discuss our study sites, case selection methods, and data collection and 
analysis approach in more detail below.  
 
A. THE JURISDICTIONS 
 
The three jurisdictions in our study vary economically, demographically, and 
politically. Centerville is a relatively wealthy, politically liberal, and diverse urban center 
with appointed judges. Townville is also urban, politically liberal, and diverse, with a 
very high poverty rate, a history of economic stagnation and appointed judges. 
Plainville is majority white, politically moderate, and sits in a fiscally and socially 
conservative state where social and government services of all kinds are under-funded, 
 
90 For a discussion of this approach, purposive sampling, see John Gerring,7 Case Selection for Case-Study 
Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL 
METHODOLOGY 645 (Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., New York: 
Oxford University Press 2008); Jason Seawright & John Gerring, Case Selection Techniques in Case Study 
Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options, 61 POL. RSCH. Q. 294 (2008). 
91 To protect the confidentiality of our study sites and research subjects and to comply with Institutional 
Review Board requirements, this Article reports no identifying information, including omitting any 
identifiable language or direct references to jurisdiction-specific substantive or procedural rules.  
92 For more discussion on this point, see Part II(B)(c) infra.  




including the courts. Most Plainville judges are elected.93 As illustrated in Table 1, the 
jurisdictions also vary in their institutional commitments to, and history of, civil access 
to justice reform, including court funding, ethics rules, and guidance and training for 
judges. We conducted an independent review of each jurisdiction’s access to justice 
reform history and civil justice context, including reviewing primary documents and 
aggregating sources.94 One of the aggregating sources, the Justice Index, regularly 
surveys and ranks U.S. states based on the strength of their access to justice reform 
efforts.95 The paragraphs that follow present the results of this review. 
 
Table 1. Jurisdiction-Level Variation in Judges’ Environments  
Site Justice 
Index 
Ethics Rules Guidance Training Governance 








Permission Yes Yes Centralized 
Plainville Near Median Permission No No Local control 
 
In the most recent Justice Index report, Centerville sits in the top 10% of 
national rankings. The jurisdiction is a recognized national leader in access to justice 
reform, including reform of the judicial role. Centerville has relatively robust legal 
scaffolding for judicial role reform that permits judges to assist people without 
counsel, encourages them to do so in limited ways, and requires them to assist in some 
circumstances. In addition, Centerville’s court administration has issued 
recommendations that encourage judges to offer assistance and accommodation to 
people without counsel voluntarily. Trial judges receive regular training on how to 
handle pro se cases.  
 
Centerville is one of only a handful of jurisdictions in the country whose 
judicial ethics rules not only permit reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants and 
clarify that such accommodations do not violate impartiality but also offer a list of 
possible tactics judges may – but are not required – to employ, which we call the 
encouraging approach. Only a handful of other states have judicial canons with 
language that similarly encourages pro se assistance instead of merely stating a general 
rule that it is permitted. Specifically, Centerville’s ethical canons encourage judges to 
consider explaining their decisions, court process, and procedural rules. However, this 
encouragement is bounded by the suggestion that judges’ explanations should be brief, 
 
93 Some Plainville judges are appointed to limited roles by the elected bench. 
94 As we have noted, to preserve anonymity, we have omitted identifying details, which sometimes 
requires us to speak at a level of abstraction about certain issues and prevents us from quoting or citing 
law or primary documents directly. 
95 Our assessment of each jurisdiction is based on our own original research, as well as aggregating 
sources, such as the Justice Index. See JUSTICE INDEX, supra note 22. 




revealing some of the contradictions and tensions inherent in judicial role reform. The 
rules also encourage judges to consider asking questions, eliciting facts, altering 
traditional trial procedures, and referring litigants to legal services.  
 
Centerville’s case law on pro se litigation goes two steps farther than the most 
common legal framework that shapes trial judge behavior in pro se cases. The common 
framework is that pro se litigants should generally be held to the same procedural and 
evidentiary standards as lawyers but that trial judges may, in some circumstances, waive 
or explain technical requirements, liberally construe pleadings, or give additional 
opportunities to amend. First, Centerville’s case law carves out a zone of special 
circumstances where judges may have a duty to inform a pro se litigant of the fact of a 
given procedural rule and the potential consequences of violating it. At the same time, 
case law clarifies that pro se parties do not have free rein to ignore procedural 
requirements. Second, Centerville’s case law recognizes the importance of protecting 
trial judge discretion while also recognizing some situations, including cases like 
protective orders that commonly involved unrepresented people, where trial judges 
may have additional duties. In some factual circumstances involving unrepresented 
litigants, Centerville judges have a duty to take affirmative steps, such as asking 
questions of witnesses, to ensure that all material facts are raised at a trial.   
 
Centerville’s court administration has issued additional guidance encouraging 
judges to take an active role in assisting pro se litigants. The guidance instructs judges 
to ensure litigants have an opportunity to be heard, understand court processes, 
decisions, and orders, and are treated with respect. Judges appointed to the bench 
receive regular training on handling pro se cases. In our experience studying civil courts, 
these judges receive more training on pro se assistance than most judges across the 
country. This training includes learning from peer judges. Centerville also has a unified 
court administration that exercises significant control over court processes and 
logistics, including judicial training and appointments. 
 
According to the Justice Index, Townville falls above the median in national 
access to justice reform rankings. Townville’s court administration is relatively strong, 
particularly compared to localized court control in Plainville. Its judicial canons permit 
judges to make reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants, but without the 
additional encouraging language Centerville and a few other jurisdictions offer. Case 
law is consistent with the general rule that preserves trial judge discretion to waive 
technical requirements while noting that all parties, regardless of representation, are 
held to the same procedural and evidentiary standards. State court administrators have 
issued additional advisory materials urging judges to explain procedures and court 
orders and make necessary referrals. Judges are appointed and receive ongoing training 
on handling pro se cases.  
 




Our final jurisdiction, Plainville, sits near the median of the Justice Index 
rankings, having made only limited efforts at the time of our study to reform its civil 
justice system or the judicial role in that system in response to the rise of lawyerless 
courts. Its judicial canons permit reasonable accommodations. Case law is consistent 
with the common legal framework that holds pro se parties to the same standards as 
lawyers while preserving trial judges’ discretion to waive procedural and evidentiary 
technicalities.  
 
At the time of our study, Plainville’s access to justice reforms consisted of 
standardized forms for some pro se litigants, including petitioners in protective order 
cases. There was no statewide guidance for judges in lawyerless courts at the time of 
our study and judges did not receive court-provided training on handling pro se cases. 
In contrast to the other two jurisdictions, Plainville’s court administration is among 
the weakest in the country in terms of its power to influence trial court management. 
Trial courts are controlled at the local level by elected judges who are functionally 
unaccountable to state court administration and do not rely on the state to fund local 
court operations.  
 
In sum, we selected these jurisdictions based on our expectations of finding 
significant cross-jurisdictional variation in whether and how judges assist pro se litigants. 
In Centerville and Townville, where judges receive training and strong court 
administrative bodies have signaled their support for pro se assistance, we expected 
judges to behave more consistently with the judicial role reform recommendations 
described in Part I(c). We particularly expected to see more of the recommended pro 
se assistance behaviors from judges in Centerville given the jurisdiction’s long history 
of investments in access to justice reform and judicial canons that permit and 
encourage such assistance, relatively supportive case law, and strong judicial training 
programs. Our expectations were much different for Plainville, which lacks statewide 
guidance and training for judges and where the canons are merely permissive. We 
expected Plainville judges to offer far less help for pro se litigants than those in other 
jurisdictions.96 
 
B. PROTECTIVE ORDER CASES 
 
We chose to study judicial behavior in a single area of law – protective orders 
for situations involving domestic abuse, harassment, stalking, or sexual assault. Three 
features of protective order cases make them a particularly useful site to explore our 
research questions. These features, which we describe below, include consistent 
 
96 We also note that, while we are principally seeking to explore the relationship between jurisdiction-
level commitments to civil justice reform and the utilization of active judging tactics, we do not foreclose 
the possibility that intra-jurisdictional differences may also inform judges’ behavior. Future studies 
would do well to consider how these differences may manifest across a sample of judges that allow for 
such subset analyses. 




substantive law, the opportunity for transferrable analysis, and a history of access to 
justice reforms.  
 
a. Consistent Substantive Law 
 
 Protective order law is relatively straightforward and consistent across 
jurisdictions. Protective order statutes first originated in the 1970s and were 
originally designed as a remedy to protect victims of intimate partner violence. These 
laws directly responded to advocates for women who initially criticized the police 
response to domestic violence and sought to have it treated like any other crime. 
Later, advocates grew critical of states’ responses under criminal law and successfully 
advocated for the creation of a civil law remedy that would protect victims from 
abuse, empower them to leave dangerous relationships, and most importantly, give 
them a measure of autonomy.97 
 
Protective orders are a form of injunctive relief paired with discretionary court 
fees and monetary awards and the potential for criminal enforcement.98 They offer 
relief provisions ranging from “no contact” or “stay away” provisions, property 
possession, and child custody.99 In protective order cases, the core question is typically 
whether the defendant engaged in a particular behavior targeted toward the petitioner 
that either harmed the petitioner directly or threatened harm. There is a relationship 
test in most jurisdictions, usually looking at whether the parties are related through a 
dating relationship, marriage, or blood. Protective orders are also available for victims 
of stalking. 
 
b. Transferrable Analysis  
 
Our choice to study protective orders offers lessons that transfer to other types 
of civil cases in two notable ways. First, protective order cases reflect the racial, class, 
and gender inequalities that permeate our society and are an inescapable feature of 
state civil courts’ work. As others have engaged more directly, we know that people 
without representation in civil court are disproportionately likely to be women and 
people of color.100 And while existing data are woefully insufficient to understand the 
 
97 See Deborah Epstein, Redefining the State's Response to Domestic Violence: Past Victories and Future Challenges, 
1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 127, 127–8 (1999); Jane Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice 39 HARV. J. GENDER 
& L. 189, 194; Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer-Do We Know That for Sure: Questioning the Efficacy of 
Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST.  LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 7, 18 (2004). 
98 For a description of the protective order legal framework, see Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: 
Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protective Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 303, 307-08, 
320-21 (2011); see also Stoever, supra note 93, at 199. 
99 Id. 
100 See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & Jessica K. Steinberg, The Gender of Gideon, 69 UCLA L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2022); Tonya Brito, Kathryn Sabbeth, Jessica Steinberg, and Lauren Sudeall, A Theory of 
Race and Civil Justice, __ COL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2022). 




myriad ways that social inequality relates to courts’ work, it is also critical to name 
these realities in this and any analysis of state civil courts.  
 
Second, we acknowledge the reflexive critique that cases involving human 
relationships, including protective order cases and other family matters, are somehow 
“different” from “regular” civil cases. This critique rests on a set of assumptions that 
are inconsistent with empirical reality. National data tell us that relational and family 
cases are a huge proportion of state civil court business.101 Theoretically and 
structurally, protective order cases are analogous to much of state civil courts’ other 
work, including contract matters like eviction, consumer debt, and medical debt.102 In 
protective orders and contract cases, representation is either absent for both parties or 
imbalanced, existing formal law ignores the complexity of the social problems driving 
litigants to court, appeals are rare, dockets are voluminous, and courts are under-
resourced.  
 
There is a meaningful difference in the rates of formal legal representation for 
parties in contract and protective order matters. In contract cases, plaintiffs are 
generally represented while defendants are not. In protective orders, both parties tend 
to lack counsel. However, as we discuss in more detail below and in Part III, the lack 
of formal representation for petitioners in protective order cases is not the whole story. 
Focusing on differences in formal representation rates conceals a robust system of 
legal assistance – short of full lawyer representation – for protective order petitioners. 
Petitioners in the jurisdictions we studied have reliable access to pre-hearing case 
development assistance provided by nonprofit domestic violence agencies. In 
addition, across protective order, debt, and eviction matters it is common for only one 
party to the case, the petitioner, to file any pleadings with the court. Finally, we note a 
much less discussed dynamic: conventional stories about eviction, debt, and protective 
order cases typically feature the notion that there is a “good” party and a “bad” party. 
Of course, the factual and legal realities of each case type is often more complex than 
this dualistic narrative suggests. Thus, despite what initial assumptions might suggest, 
the generalizability of these data is strong. 
 
c. Access to Justice Reform History 
 
Protective order cases are an area of civil court operations that have seen 
significant investments in access to justice reform in recent years, including self-help, 
limited legal services, and judicial training. In many jurisdictions, including the three in 
our study at the time we were collecting data, courts and outside agencies have invested 
far more in improving how courts and judges process protective orders than other 
 
101 Colleen F. Shanahan, Jessica K. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, & Alyx Mark, What State Civil Courts 
Do, __ COL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2022).  
102 For the most recent national data, see The Landscape of Civil Litigation, supra note 8. 




common civil court case types such as eviction and debt.103 Thus, at a minimum, there 
is little reason to think that judges in protective order cases are in some systematic way 
performing their roles in lawyerless courts differently, or more importantly “worse,” 
than other civil judges in these courts. In fact, protective orders are an area of law 
where judges are likely to have been exposed to information about unrepresented 
people’s needs and the potential for judicial assistance to meet those needs. 
 
Petitioners are the primary focus of service-based reforms connected to 
protective order dockets.104 At the time of our study, there were no court-based or 
court-adjacent free legal services for defendants in our study jurisdictions. In each 
study jurisdiction, courts have developed and made available a set of court forms, 
including petitions, draft orders, and returns of service. And at least one domestic 
violence agency works collaboratively with the court to offer a broad menu of social 
and legal services, both inside and outside the courthouse. Domestic violence 
advocates who worked for or were trained by these agencies sat in the courtroom 
during dockets and assisted petitioners.105 Providers help people decide whether to 
pursue a protective order, offer legal advice and information, and assist in completing 
and filing all necessary forms. In all three jurisdictions, petitioners file form pleadings 
with the court, but defendants do not. Instead, in these summary proceedings, a 
defendant’s only opportunity to respond happens live, in-court, during a hearing on 
the merits. 
 
C. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
We observed approximately 200 hours of live court proceedings across the 
three sites. These proceedings include 357 protective order hearings involving at least 
one person without counsel. While in court, the research team took verbatim notes on 
 
103 Investments in improving court processes and increasing access to legal services in debt and 
eviction cases – particularly in eviction – have been on the increase in recent years including a burst of 
activity in eviction in the context of the pandemic. See e.g., DECEMBER 2020 INTERIM REPORT: 
LEVERAGING THE UTAH SANDBOX TO ADVANCE LEGAL EMPOWERMENT FOR UTAH COMMUNITY 
MEMBERS EXPERIENCING MEDICAL DEBT, INNOVATION FOR JUSTICE, THE UNIVERSITY OF 
ARIZONA JAMES E. ROGERS COLLEGE OF LAW, available at 
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1Zkpb_Sq-
xbmTFGQrs5nApmi9IBoa46flWHTg7Zp4DXo/edit?usp=sharing, (last visited August 8, 2021); Tiny 
Chat 49: Eviction Diversion, National Center for State Courts, available at 
https://vimeo.com/542219208 (last visited August 8, 2021).  
104 This has been supported in large part by the 1994 initial enactment, subsequent revisions, and 
related funding of the Violence Against Women Act. 
105 For a fuller discussion of findings about the role of domestic violence advocates in our study, 
including the relationship between these advocates’ work and deregulation of the legal profession and 
practice of law, see Jessica K. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Judges 
and Deregulation of the Lawyers’ Monopoly, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2021) [hereinafter Judges and 
Deregulation]. 




everything judges and litigants said.106 Wherever possible, we made notes about the 
court environment beyond the case being heard at any given moment. We recorded 
exchanges we heard and things we saw around the courtroom, including interactions 
involving litigants in the audience, court clerks, domestic violence advocates, law 
students, and bailiffs, to name a few. We also conducted semi-structured interviews 
with the judges in Centerville and Plainville, which tapped the justifications and 
processes underlying the behavior we observed in the courtroom and included 
questions about the proper role of judge and how that role has evolved and adapted 
to accommodate a majority pro se docket.  
 
Due to the dearth of empirical scholarship and theory development on trial 
judge behavior in state civil courts, we recognized that we needed to be flexible as we 
reviewed and defined the themes and phenomena we constructed from the data.107 
For example, at the beginning of data collection, we anticipated we would code a 
category of judicial behavior as “eliciting” when judges asked questions to elicit 
testimony. During observations, it became clear that the category was not sufficiently 
nuanced—there were two distinct forms of eliciting, leading and non-leading. As we 
explain in Part III, this difference has important consequences for how we think about 
the different ways judges elicit information from litigants and how these differences 
might alter development of the factual record.108 
 
After we completed data collection, we converted our raw observation and 
interview notes to text files and used a qualitative coding platform, ATLAS.ti, for 
thematic analyses. Based on our review of existing literature and recommendations for 
judicial role reform, we then followed a theoretically informed qualitative coding 
 
106 We sought and received Institutional Review Board approval to conduct this study (Protocol 17-28), 
which was found to be exempt. Throughout our data collection and analysis process, including drafting 
this Article, we seek to preserve the confidentiality of our study sites. We sought permission to conduct 
court observations and interviews and were able to observe all judges working in each jurisdiction at 
time of data collection, including five judges in Centerville, four in Townville, and two in Plainville. Of 
these, two judges in Centerville and two in Plainville consented to be interviewed. Unfortunately, none 
of the judges in Townville consented to an interview. Judge and court resistance to our research existed 
in different ways as we conducted our research. In Townville, though individual judges directly 
expressed varied willingness to be interviewed and some spoke “unofficially” to researchers, the 
administrative judge of the court instructed all of the observed judges that they may not be officially 
interviewed. In addition, a fourth jurisdiction was originally intended to be a site of research and while 
an individual judge welcomed observation and interview, the administrative judge of the relevant docket 
refused to allow either. Despite clear law in the jurisdiction that the court could not prohibit 
observation, we decided not to pursue data collection in that jurisdiction. In any situation where a case 
was called and at least one party was present and had an interaction with a judge, we counted it as a 
hearing. 
107 See Virginia Braun & Victoria Clarke, Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
IN PSYCHOLOGY 3, 77-101 (2006).  
108 See Part III(A)(b) infra for a discussion of judges’ approaches to eliciting information from litigants.  




protocol and analysis process.109 All researchers reviewed the raw data files across 
study sites and identified a range of potential codes and broader themes. The 
researchers shared their initial codes and themes and refined them through an iterative 
process. Next, the full dataset was coded by one researcher for evidence of the 
utilization of the active judging tactics and the emergent nuances therein, beginning 
with our court observation field notes, followed by the interview data. In this process, 
we coded for both judicial behaviors that appeared in hearing transcripts and for the 
explanations judges gave about their approach during interviews. Through this 
process, we also recognized the importance of capturing missed opportunities for 
judges to assist pro se litigants and identifying mismatches between a judge’s expressed 
interests and her courtroom behaviors. For example, in interviews, judges identified 
fairness as a principle guiding their work. During hearing observations, we identified 
opportunities for judges to advance that principle. We noted missed opportunities 
such as a judge who refused to answer basic questions or used jargon. We contend 
that these missed or even overtly rejected opportunities have consequences for 
substantive and procedural justice.   
 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section presents and discusses results from our comparative data about 
state civil trial court judges in lawyerless courts. This exploration includes whether and 
how judges have altered the traditional judicial role to assist pro se litigants in hearings. 
Our reporting and analysis of the key themes of judicial behavior in state civil courts 
is reflective of the pervasive, patterned behaviors we observed and categorized across 
judges and jurisdictions, as well as of the relevance of the themes to our central 
research questions.110 Importantly, it does not foreclose the possibility that other 
researchers would identify additional or alternative themes in observations of these 
courts, or of other courts and judges.  
 
As we described in Part I, scholars and access to justice reformers have painted 
a hopeful vision for judicial role reform as an access to justice intervention while courts 
and access to justice think-tanks have developed and disseminated guidance and best 
practices. But while law generally permits pro se assistance from judges, formal law on 
the scope and nature of such assistance remains underdeveloped and leaves individual 
judges with discretion and responsibility to decide whether and how to assist people 
without counsel.  
 
Our primary finding is surprising – we did not observe meaningful variation 
across judges or jurisdictions. Judges in the sample approached pro se hearings in similar 
 
109 See Jennifer Fereday & Eimear Muir-Cochrane, Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid 
Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development, 5 INT’L J. QUALITATIVE METHODS 1, 4 
(2006). 
110 See Braun & Clarke, supra note 107.  




ways and consistently offered little assistance to pro se litigants. Our court observation 
data show two categories of similar behavior, which we describe in detail and illustrate 
with examples from the data in this Part. First, judges maintained legal and procedural 
complexity. Judges rarely explained court processes, legal concepts, and language as 
advocates for role reform have widely recommended. Instead, they used legal jargon 
consistently, often refused to answer litigants’ questions, and sometimes criticized 
litigants for asking questions or expressing confusion. Second, in contrast to the vision 
of a judge who listens patiently to narrative testimony and asks questions to gather as 
much information as possible, judges tightly controlled the presentation of evidence 
and prevented parties from offering narratives or shaping the order and substance of 
their testimony. Judges also leaned heavily on one party’s pleading, the petition, to 
guide their questioning.  
 
A. SIMILARITIES IN JUDGES’ COURTROOM BEHAVIOR 
 
a. Maintaining Legal and Procedural Complexity 
 
Across our observations, judges exercised process control and wielded legal 
jargon in ways that maintained legal and procedural complexity in their courtrooms. 
The judicial reform vision championed by scholars, court guidance, and access to 
justice advocates emphasizes the judges’ role in providing explanations and sharing 
information with litigants. However, this behavior was uncommon in our data. 
 
In this section, we illustrate how judges maintained legal and procedural 
complexity in their courtrooms. We first discuss the role of opening speeches as 
explanations. Rather than offering accessible, plain-language explanations to individual 
litigants and regularly checking in to confirm understanding as guidance recommends, 
we rarely observed judges offering information about substantive law, procedures, or 
legal terms beyond prepared opening speeches for the entire courtroom. We next show 
how, when we did observe judges giving explanations, the explanations were brief and 
judges consistently used legal jargon rather than accessible language. Finally, we show 
that when parties asked questions or sought explanations, judges often refused to 
answer. We observed seemingly frustrated judges criticizing or mocking litigants for 
their lack of legal expertise in some extreme examples.  
 
i. Opening Speeches as Explanations 
 
Judges consistently across our study jurisdictions began the court session with 
brief opening speeches to the entire courtroom. In some cases, judges gave live 
speeches. In others, the speeches were pre-recorded. Opening speeches had an 
efficient, check-the-box quality, consistent with some judges telling us they worked 
from a script received in training. In most hearings, judges did not repeat their opening 




speeches, although court sessions involved multiple cases and many minutes or hours 
may have passed between the speech and a case being called.  
 
Inevitably, some litigants were not present in the courtroom during opening 
speeches. In the busy courtrooms we observed, parties sometimes arrived late or 
moved in and out of the courtroom. Despite this, the judges seemed to assume that 
one opening speech was sufficient to convey the desired information to every litigant. 
  
For example, Plainville Judge 1’s opening speech emphasized how the judge 
expected litigants to behave in the courtroom and did not explain legal or procedural 
issues other than noting that a protective order comes with a $200 fine and a firearms 
prohibition. These are just two of many possible consequences of a protective order, 
such as loss of physical liberty for the defendant. Plainville Judge 1’s opening speech 
did not describe what a protective order is, whether functionally or as a matter of law 
and did not mention that criminal charges can result from a violation of an order:  
 
I’ll call cases in order they are listed. When I call your case, please stand, 
stay where you are, and remain standing until I address you. I’ll ask 
plaintiffs if they want to proceed and are ready to proceed. For 
defendants, I’ll ask if you object. If you object, we will need to have a 
hearing. If defendants don’t object or if we have a hearing, there’s a 
court fee of about $200 if there’s a permanent protective order, and 
there is a prohibition on having firearms. There’s a federal law. So there 
are consequences to a protective order. This is a court of law, so there 
should be no eyerolling, no gestures to the opposing party. I expect 
and demand civility for everyone. We have resources for both parties 
in the courtroom. Representatives from [a domestic violence agency] 
are here to help you with resources or services.  
 
In the example above, which varied little from day-to-day, the judge opens by stating 
the judge will call cases in the “order they are listed.” However, litigants did not have 
access to a list of cases and thus had no way to know when their case would be called. 
Some litigants waited up to an hour or more for the judge to call their case.  
 
The judge also refers litigants to staff from a domestic violence agency. Two 
of the agency’s staff were always seated at the front of the courtroom near the judge’s 
dais. Despite this, the judge’s referral to these advocates was both substantively 
inaccurate and impossible for most litigants to operationalize without more specific 
guidance. The referral is inaccurate because the judge states that the agency can “help 
everyone,” but the agency primarily serves petitioners and does not serve parties on 
two sides of the same case. Functionally, litigants had almost no way to access or 
communicate with the domestic violence agency staff given where they were seated in 
the courtroom. A person who wanted to speak to one of the agency staff would have 




to walk up to the front of the courtroom in full view of everyone and pass directly in 
front of the judge and any litigants whose cases were being heard. Unsurprisingly, 
litigants generally did not approach the domestic violence agency staff during docket 
calls.111  
 
In Townville, judges’ opening speeches focused on describing protective order 
cases' legal and procedural framework. In these speeches, judges consistently used 
technical, inaccessible language. Townville judges’ opening speeches usually included 
a vague reference to the controlling statute (“the Act”) and legal jargon about the 
standard of proof, as in this example from Townville Judge 1: 
 
Today, domestic violence cases will be heard. I will decide whether to 
issue a protective order where there has been an act of domestic 
violence. The applicable relationships are defined by the Act. This is a 
civil court. First, we apply the civil standard of proof, which is a 
preponderance of the evidence, not the criminal standard of proof, 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Preponderance of the evidence just means 
more likely than not… 
 
Additional language from Townville judges’ opening speeches included a robust 
warning about various civil and criminal consequences of a protective order. 
Unfortunately, like the statement above, the speech was rife with other jargon, such 
as, “The defendant may stipulate to the complaint and the court will issue a protective 
order.” Notably, each of the Townville judges used variations of a statement provided 
to judges in their initial training program, suggesting that judges are willing to 
implement such guidance.  
   
ii. Limited Explanations and Frequent Use of Jargon 
 
Judicial role reform guidance emphasizes that the language of law and courts 
is unfamiliar for unrepresented people and urges judges to explain law, procedure, and 
language throughout the litigation process. In interviews, most of the judges in our 
study discussed the importance of offering information. But in court observations, 
explanations were rare. Outside of the routine opening speeches described above, 
judges typically offered litigants only the most limited explanations, commonly used 
legal jargon, and often seemed to ignore or dismiss litigants’ obvious confusion.  
 
 
111 As we describe in greater detail in another article based on this study, Plainville Judge 1 consistently 
relied on advocates to give petitioners information and guidance after the judge had called their case, 
particularly in cases with no service on the defendant. In these instances, the judge relied on advocates 
to affirmatively walk up to petitioners or point them in the right direction. This is the main way that we 
saw litigants make a connection with the advocates, as opposed to litigants seeking the advocates out 
without prompting. See Steinberg, Carpenter, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 97. 




The following is a small sample of the jargon and technical terms we observed: 
 
Centerville Judge 1: 
 
Judge: When she files a protective order, the judge listens and if she 
makes a prima facie case, the judge issues it. 
___ 
 
Judge: You have the burden of proof. Provide me with the factual 
predicate for the relief you seek in this case. So, what happened and 
when, how it affected you, and what relief you’re seeking. 
      
Centerville Judge 2: 
 
Judge: The defendant can file a motion to set aside the default, but just 
filing the motion doesn’t automatically set it aside. 
     
___ 
 
Petitioner: My son was present when [the defendant] choked me. What 
is the appropriate age to be a witness? He’s nine.  
 
Judge: The Court will do voir dire to determine if the child knows the   




Judge: You may file a motion to set aside stating your reason for not 
appearing and meritorious defenses or reasons the court should vacate 
the order. That’s it you’ve been served; you are free to go. 
Defendant: So, now do I do the motion? 
Judge: No, you have to file that. 
Defendant: She told me to come down and ask and say I had filled out 
the paper, but it was wrong. 
Judge: If you filed something today it will be calendared by the clerk’s 
office, not today. 
Defendant: She also told me that I should tell you I never received 
anything. 




Judge: Well, if you have grounds to vacate the judgment, you need to 
file a motion. We have a full calendar. 
Plainville Judge 1 
 
Judge: So, you object because these are different days? So, you’re telling 
me this is not relevant?  
 
Townville Judge 1 
 




Judge: This is not criminal court. It’s civil. So, the standard is 
preponderance of the evidence, not reasonable doubt. 
 
A longer example from Townville Judge 4 further illustrates judges’ lack of 
explanations and use of jargon. In the excerpt, the judge makes a procedural decision 
without explanation in the face of an unrepresented defendant’s clear attempt to 
advocate for himself by making an argument against admitting a photograph. In 
response, the judge seems to express frustration, uses jargon, and then simply admits 
the evidence without acknowledging the defendant’s argument:  
 





Judge: On what basis? [The judge does not give the defendant time to 
respond before turning to the petitioner, who offered the evidence, 





Judge: [To the defendant] Why do you object? 
 
Defendant: On May 13th, I did not touch her. 
 
Judge: [Sounding frustrated] No, no. The photo. That’s not the 
question. She’s saying they show her condition. The question is are 
they admissible. 





Defendant: She said November 2016. She’s talking about May. 
 
Judge: [Ignores the defendant and turns to the clerk] That should be 
marked as Petitioners #1. 
 
We observed that even when judges seemed to make more significant attempts 
to offer information and explanations, they still consistently fell back on using 
technical language. In the next excerpt, Centerville Judge 1 explains protective order 
trial process to an unrepresented petitioner who is facing a lawyer on the other side of 
the case: 
 
Judge: This is a trial. You have the burden of proving your case under 
the [formal name of state statute] and you have to do so by what’s 
called a preponderance of the evidence, which means more than fifty-
fifty. So, you tell me what happened to you. Why do you think it 
[violates the law]? Then the defendant will get a chance to present his 
case through cross-examination or just explaining his version of what 
happened. And I will hear brief closing arguments if either party has 
them. Begin when you’re ready. 
 
Petitioner: Ok, I am not a lawyer, so I don’t know all the things that 
they may know [laughs nervously]. 
 
Judges’ explanations about the process of a trial tended to follow the pattern in the 
excerpt above. Judges would name component parts of the trial process but without 
defining terms or explaining the legal standard and the type of facts that might be 
relevant.  
 
iii. Refusing to Explain 
 
In interviews, most judges expressed awareness and empathy regarding how 
little the average person who appears in court knows about law and litigation 
processes. For example, Centerville Judge 2 spoke of litigants’ general reluctance to 
ask questions and talked about the human tendency to be embarrassed when 
expressing what we do not know.  
 
Pro se litigants often act like they know the law or the procedures, and 
they do not. They are embarrassed to say they don’t know what is going 
on, or for example a word you use. They won’t ask what it 
means…maybe not every judge wants to explain things. In my 
experience it is just worth the time to explain it. One who works with 
pro se litigants has to be very, very patient…I try to explain how my 




courtroom operates. I try to give the lay of the land…I think you want 
it to be fair, particularly if one side is represented. It’s not that you’re 
helping them win, but you’re explaining things slowly and carefully.  
 
But contrary to this expressed intention, we observed that when litigants did find the 
courage to ask questions, judges most often explicitly refused to answer. Litigants 
asked judges to define terms, explain court processes, or explain legal standards. Judges 
most often responded to litigants’ questions by, at a minimum, ignoring the question 
or, at worst, criticizing the litigant for asking the question.  
 
Different phrases in the vein of “I’m not your lawyer” were a common refrain 
in Centerville and Townville, in particular. We also observed numerous examples of 
judges saying things like, “I can’t try this case for you” or “I can’t be your attorney, 
buddy.” Such phrases were often followed by an admonition to get a lawyer’s advice, 
something that is far outside the financial ability of most litigants. Judges made such 
dismissive statements when litigants appeared to be struggling the most to understand 
a legal concept, term, or procedural step.  
 
In the example below, Centerville Judge 2 ridicules a defendant for not 
knowing a legal term and rebuffs his questions about the terms of a court order. This 
case involved a represented petitioner and an unrepresented, incarcerated defendant: 
 
Judge: [To defendant] You heard the [request for a continuance from 
petitioner’s counsel]. Do you oppose it?  
 
Defendant: No, I am fine going ahead with that.  
 
Judge: Are you saying you are consenting to the [protective order]?  
 
Defendant: No, no. I am just not sure what you mean when you say 
oppose.  
 
Judge: Are you seriously telling me you don’t know what the word 
“oppose” means?  
 
Defendant: Yes ma’am, I am sorry.  
 
Judge: Oppose means you are against it. 
 
Defendant: Oh, no, I am not against it. We can do it when she wants 
to.  
 




Judge: So, that’s with consent of Defendant… just make sure you have 
vacated the residence.  
 
Defendant: What? Where did that come from?  
 
Judge: This order has been in effect since October 26th. 
 
Defendant: Well, how can I vacate the residence if I am in jail?  
 
Judge: You were served with it. Did you read the order?  
 
Defendant: That just doesn’t make sense. So, you are telling me I can’t 
talk to my mother? 
 
Judge: That’s all in the order.  
 
Defendant: I never had the order read to me. I am not sure why I am 
even in jail. I haven’t been able to cut my hair in jail. I am embarrassed 
to be outside like this.  
 
In another example, Townville Judge 1 is attempting to reschedule a hearing. 
In the process, the judge faces a series of questions from both parties. Some questions 
are related to the case while some are not. The judge resists offering information, even 
when the defendant asks about terms of the court’s temporary order and seemingly 
does not know what document to review to find those terms. Instead, the judge refers 
the defendant to an attorney: 
 
Judge: How do you want to proceed? 
 
Defendant: I don’t want to lose seeing my kids or my job. 
 
Judge: Do you want an attorney? 
 
Defendant: I guess. 
 
Judge: I will postpone to a date certain. With or without an attorney, 
we will try the case. The protective order is in full effect until then. 
 
Judge: [To petitioner] Do you have anything to add? 
 
Petitioner: I’m sorry about the phone earlier.  
 
Judge: It’s okay. 





Petitioner: I want to say that when I filed for a temporary protective 
order I was revictimized by the hearing officer, [name]. I want a 
permanent protective order until I’m confident about lifting it. I’m 
okay with sharing custody. I want to fire my attorney [the petitioner 
mentions having an attorney, but there was no attorney present in 
court during this hearing]. 
 
Judge: I’ll break it down. I can’t make it permanent until a trial. If it’s 
granted, there’s always a way for you to lift it. 
 
Petitioner: That’s what I want.  
 
Judge: That’s what the hearing is about. I don’t get involved with your 
attorney. You can do what you want in two weeks. We’ll deal with 
custody at the hearing. 
 
Defendant: Can you explain what you said? A lot just happened. 
 
Judge: She wants an order until she feels safe. 
 
Defendant: I don’t want to lose the kids. 
 
Judge: So, you have time to talk to an attorney. Whether you hire an 
attorney or not, I can’t explain things. I can’t give legal advice. 
 
Defendant: I’m not a bad guy. 
 
Judge: I don’t judge good guy or bad guy. I judge the facts. Talk to a 
lawyer before the hearing in two weeks. 
 
Defendant: Can I see the kids? 
 
Judge: It’s in the temporary order. 
 
Defendant: Which one? 
 
Judge: It says “Friday supervised.” 
 
Petitioner: It was modified. 
 
Judge: What is it? 
 




Petitioner: Supervised in his home on weekends, with curbside pickup. 
And they can’t be with their granddad until there’s a psych eval or a 
hearing. 
 
Defendant: I’m confused. We were going to do something with 
holidays. 
 
Petitioner: Can I speak to that? I’m firing my attorney because I was 
revictimized and got bad information. I was told by attorney and 
hearing officer that the case would be beat because I didn’t have 
pictures of the harm he did and that the protective order would be 
lifted and not extended. 
 
Judge: I know here at the beginning when we said we’re having a 
trial…I won’t comment on what the attorney and hearing officer said. 
I hear the evidence and decide. I will give you two weeks and you can 
get an attorney. 
 
Defendant: If I have supervised visits, how does she drop them off? 
 
Judge: Curbside. She drops the kids at the curb. The 8-year-old takes 
the 5-year-old to the front door. You don’t come out. 
 
Petitioner: My concern is not [defendant] and the kids. My concern is 
[defendant] and me. 
 
Judge: Right. The final protective order will consider the kids interests 
and that parents are involved. 
 
Petitioner: It’s just me. Everything is in place. 
 
Defendant: I don’t want to lose my job and my kids.  
 
Judge: We are adjourned. 
 
A final example of judges’ resistance to offering explanations involves 
Townville Judge 2 and an incarcerated defendant. During the hearing, the petitioner 
mentions another case she has with the defendant and states there will be a hearing in 
that case later in the week. The incarcerated defendant then asks how he can get to the 
hearing. The judge responds: “That’s not my concern.” A moment later, the defendant 
asks, “What am I in jail for?” The judge responds, “I didn’t arrest you. I don’t know.” 
Moments later, the defendant was removed from the courtroom by law enforcement.  
 




In contrast to the reform vision of a helpful judge who carefully explains law, 
process, and the language of the courtroom for people without legal training, the 
proceedings we observed lacked transparency and judges’ behavior upheld court 
complexity. Rather than offering information or explanations, all judges in our sample 
consistently controlled and limited access to information, used legal jargon, and 
resisted direct questions. Occasionally, seemingly frustrated judges criticized litigants 
for asking questions and exhibiting lack of knowledge about the legal system. In these 
ways, judicial behavior kept the dockets we observed lawyer-centric and legalistic as 
opposed to pro se friendly. 
 
b. Controlling and Constraining Evidence Presentation  
 
In lawyerless courts, getting facts on the record inevitably requires deviations 
from traditional witness examination and evidence presentation—including narrative 
testimony and questioning by the judge, given that there are no lawyers to run the 
evidence presentation process. Guidance materials suggest judges should allow parties 
to offer narrative testimony, listen patiently, and ask neutral, non-leading questions. 
While we found that all judges engaged in eliciting behavior, the way they elicited 
information was in sharp contrast to guidance because judges limited narrative 
testimony, constrained parties’ efforts to offer evidence, and relied heavily on the 
petition (the only pleading filed by either party) to determine what evidence they would 
consider.    
 
In this section, we draw on examples from the data to show how judges tightly 
controlled and constrained evidence presentation. We first discuss how judges’ 
approach was ultimately imbalanced in favor of petitioners because they relied heavily 
on the facts and legal claims in petitioners’ pleadings to drive their questions. Second, 
we describe how judges consistently used a leading questioning style to develop facts 
and legal issues and constrained the amount of information parties were allowed to 
present, particularly defendants. 
 
i. Relying on the Petition  
 
In the protective order cases we observed, only one party makes legal and 
factual claims through pleadings—the petitioner, through standardized court forms. 
The petitioner is the only party who can put their claims in front of the judge prior to 
and during the hearing. Given that all petitioners use standard forms, the claims are 
presented in a way that is consistently organized and predictable across cases. By 
comparison, defendants must make their claims through verbal testimony, which is 
inevitably less clear, organized, and cognizable than claims made via written pleadings. 
Petitions played a pivotal role in shaping the legal and factual claims judges considered 
during hearings.  
 




In all three jurisdictions at the time of our study, most petitioners received 
extensive pre-hearing legal assistance from court-connected domestic violence 
agencies.112 The assistance domestic agencies offer includes meeting with potential 
petitioners to discuss facts, identify potential legal claims, and draft their petitions. As 
a result, many petitioners’ cases were relatively well-developed before any hearing. All 
petitioners, whether they received individualized assistance or not, had the benefit of 
court-provided standardized forms complete with checkboxes for legal claims, lists of 
possible forms of relief with fill-in-the-blank options, and definitions of legal terms. 
There were no similar services or standardized forms for defendants. 
 
Judges consistently and routinely referred to dates or events alleged in petitions 
at the beginning of and throughout the course of hearings. All judges in our study had 
the opportunity to review the petition in advance of and during every hearing, and they 
often relied on petitions to shape the scope and depth of evidence presentation, 
including the questions they asked litigants and scope of testimony they were willing 
to entertain. We consistently observed judges reading petitions and explicitly referring 
to these pleadings during hearings. We offer a few examples below. 
 
Townville Judge 2 
 
Judge: There are a bunch of allegations in the [petition]. Can you put 
them on the record? This incident, the daughter told school and [a 
child welfare agency] opened an investigation. Can you tell me some 
of the incidents? 
___ 
 




Judge: It says in the [petition] there’s no history.  
 
Townville Judge 4 
 
Judge: What occurred on May 7th at 10:00 p.m. that caused you to get 
a protective order? [The judge says “get” a protective order but this is 
a hearing on the merits of that order being granted.] 
 
Petitioner: You said May 7th?  
 
 
112 For a robust description of the assistance available to petitioners, see Steinberg, Carpenter, Shanahan 
& Mark, supra note 97. 




Judge: Your [petition] says May 7.  
 
Plainville Judge 1 
Judge: Ready to go? Let me look at your filing. [Reads petition then 
swears parties in and turns to petitioner] She’s your former daughter 
in law, related by marriage, you filed a police report, you live in 
[Plainville], the facts occurred in [Plainville]. Is everything in this 
petition true and correct? 
___ 
 
Judge: [To petitioner, while reading from petition] [The defendant] is 
your aunt, you both reside in Plainville, the facts happened here, and 
July 25 is the date. Tell me why you need a protective order.  
 
Petitioner: I need a protective order because on July 25 I was being 
picked up from my ex’s house, and she called me and told me I’m 
going to end up in the hospital and she’s going to end up in jail. And 
my worker heard her say it on the phone. 
 
Judge: She used to yell at you in the morning every day? You feel she 
will make good on the threat and you don’t feel safe [Doesn’t wait for 
answer]? 
 
Judge: [To petitioner’s witness] Are you the co-worker who heard the 
call? Tell me what you heard. 
 
At the time of our study, none of the jurisdictions offered standardized 
pleading forms or any systematic, court-based assistance for defendants. A defendant’s 
only opportunity to raise defenses or counterclaims is in live court, where the judge is 
often the only lawyer the courtroom. We did not observe judges making any efforts to 
guide defendants in understanding the possible range and nature of their defenses. 
Across our observations, judges did not appear to take steps to account for defendants’ 
lack of opportunity to answer allegations in writing or the fact that many petitioners, 
and few defendants, received substantial legal assistance from nonlawyer advocates. 
 
In most evidentiary hearings, after taking testimony from the petitioner—
guided by the petition—judges simply asked defendants a brief, open-ended question. 
We did not observe judges explaining legal or procedural issues to defendants, such as 
the burden of proof, the potential for incriminating themselves, or the legal elements 
at issue, as in the examples that follow. 
 




Plainville Judge 1 
Judge: [To defendant] What do you need to tell me? 
 
Townville Judge 2 
 




Judge: [To defendant] What would you like to tell me? 
 
Centerville Judge 1 
 
Judge: [To defendant] All right, you can ask him questions or tell your 
side of the story. 
___ 
Judge: [To defendant] Do you want to state your case then you can call 
your witnesses? 
ii. Tightly Controlling Evidence Presentation  
 
Across the data, judges exerted tight control over evidence presentation by 
asking leading questions—including questions based on the petition—and constricting 
parties’ opportunity to present testimony, particularly narrative testimony. In the most 
common eliciting pattern we observed, judges would ask a litigant a relatively open-
ended question to begin testimony, sometimes by referencing the date or description 
of an event in the petition. The judge would then allow the party a short narrative, 
often just a sentence or two. Beyond this point, judges showed little interest in or 
patience for narrative testimony or party control over the presentation of evidence. 
Judges tightly controlled most testimony via restrictive, leading questions and often 
shut down parties’ attempts to offer evidence if judges perceived that they were not, 
as one judge said, “getting to the point.”113 Sometimes, judges decided cases after 
allowing one or both parties to say no more than a few sentences, as we illustrate with 
some striking examples below. 
 
In interviews, most judges described confidence in their ability to get relevant 
facts on the record via questions, as well as their authorization as a matter of law to do 
so. In fact, more than one judge expressed a sentiment that the literature suggests is 
common among judges in lawyerless courts: the idea that lawyers make cases and 
 
113 Plainville Judge 2. 




hearings more complicated and time-consuming given that judges know how to get 
the information they need without lawyers’ maneuvering.114 As Plainville Judge 2 said: 
 
If there are two lawyers, then it’s gonna be a formal hearing, and it 
takes for-friggin’-ever, which is fine, but I can get to the truth…I can 
get to the facts… I read the petition, and then I ask ‘em questions. I 
don’t just say, “Tell me your story,” which is why those protective 
order hearings, years ago, could take forever because the pro ses aren’t 
good at getting to the point. They wanna talk about how the person 
treated them, stole their money, things that are irrelevant in my court.  
 
Plainville Judge 1 expressed slightly less comfort with the role of an active questioner, 
describing it as a matter of necessity and efficiency: 
 
I developed a learning curve advantage being on the protective order 
docket because you learn how vital it is to be fair…as a protective order 
judge, I had to examine them. I didn’t want to have to, and the other 
attorneys don’t like it because I’m in their business, but I always give 
the other attorney more time on direct. But you have to be efficient. 
You couldn’t coddle people but you have to get the facts.  
 
Some judges made statements about the importance of letting litigants present 
their case and suggested that they tried to do so in the courtroom. As Plainville Judge 
1 put it: “[I ask] Why do you need the protective order? And then I let them tell their 
story.” Centerville Judge 2 said, “Oftentimes respondents will say ‘hey, they got to talk 
for ten minutes, can I?’ And sure. That’s some people’s idea of fairness.”  
 
However, in contrast to the last two statements above, court observations 
showed most judges did not afford parties significant opportunities to give narrative 
testimony or shape the order and scope of evidence presentation. This was particularly 
true for defendants. Plainville Judge 2’s perspective above about limiting “irrelevant” 
testimony and Plainville Judge 1’s statement about “efficiency” and not “coddling” 
people are much more consistent with the approach we observed across judges. 
Indeed, in another part of the interview, Centerville Judge 2 acknowledged managing 
testimony when parties were saying “irrelevant” or “nonsensical” things: 
 
You have good witnesses, you have very poor witnesses…they say 
things that are irrelevant or nonsensical. I try to get them on track 




114 JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 56, at ix. 




During hearings, we commonly heard judges say things akin to Townville 
Judge 4’s statement when he told a litigant, “You have to follow my questions.” In the 
example below, Centerville Judge 4 opens a hearing with a statement that appears 
designed to prepare parties for being directed and redirected: 
 
Now, the way this hearing will be conducted because you don’t have 
attorneys is I will ask the questions. Don’t talk to each other. 
Everything you want to say might not be relevant under the law, so 
manage your expectations right now. 
 
Another example of a judge controlling evidence presentation and 
limiting the evidence comes from another hearing conducted by Centerville 
Judge 4. In this case, the defendant had filed a motion for civil contempt 
alleging that the petitioner was not bringing their child to a visitation exchange 
point as required by the court’s order. In a hearing that lasted only a few 
minutes, the judge suggested the parties were not answering the judge’s 
questions but then gave them almost no opportunity to speak. He then 
asserted that the issue the defendant has raised—enforcement of a visitation 
order—does not belong in court at all. He then quickly decided the case, telling 
the parties to “follow the order.” 
Judge: [To petitioner] This provision is for your protection. Can you 
tell me what happened? 
Petitioner: The paper says— 
Judge: I don’t care what the paper says. The question is are you 
bringing the child to the station as the order requires. 
Petitioner: They said if he doesn’t text, I don’t have to bring my son. 
Defendant: I have texts in my phone. 
 
Judge: You think I’m going to take all this time with all these people 
here to go through that. You are both adults. [Both parties start to 
speak] I don’t want to get in the middle of hearing you guys argue. You 
don’t come here to the court to have your little disagreement. You 
don’t answer my questions and you won’t get heard at all. [To 
petitioner] So, you’re telling me he doesn’t text you. 
 
Petitioner: Certain days he does text me. 
 




Judge: Well, I’m denying your motion and everything stays as it is. Go 
home and follow the order. 
 
In another example, Centerville Judge 1 presided over a hearing where both 
parties had filed petitions against one another. After hearing just a few minutes of 
testimony, the judge suddenly decided to dismiss both cases without hearing the facts 
that one of the litigants (Litigant 2) might have offered to support his claims. In the 
hearing, Centerville Judge 1 first allowed Litigant 1 to offer some evidence to meet her 
burden of proof. She alleged serious physical abuse. She also appeared to be 
experiencing mental illness:  
 
Litigant 1: He is compulsive and abusive mentally and physically 
toward my son and I. He has been raping, abusing, manipulating, 
terrorizing. What are the words I’m looking for? 
 
Judge: Words are important, but actions are more important. 
 
Litigant 1: I’m not sure how this man can physically abuse me all these 
years and get away with it. 
 
Judge: Whether the criminal justice system works is not at issue here. 
What’s at issue is whether he committed an offense [under the statute].  
 
The judge appears to assume the litigant knows the difference between the criminal 
and civil systems. He then asks if she has pictures, which she produces on a phone and 
hands to the judge’s clerk. It is unclear what role the photos played in the judge’s final 
decision as he did not mention them again. Next, Litigant 1 began to discuss her son 
and the judge responded, “Your relationship with your son has nothing to do with this 
case” and shut down Litigant 1’s testimony on this topic.  
 
After the judge’s exchange with Litigant 1, Litigant 2 had only a limited 
opportunity to speak and no real opportunity to offer facts to support his petition. He 
only had a chance to deny, as a general matter, Litigant 1’s allegations and assert that 
she was mentally ill. Soon after, the judge suddenly said to Litigant 2, “You filed a case. 
Why don’t you present it?” Litigant 2’s subsequent testimony was brief, only a few 
sentences, including two brief statements alluding to his claims: “her behavior became 
unmanageable. Police had been called, there were family disturbances. I’ve had them 
come to remove her.” After this statement, Litigant 1 interrupted, saying “lies.” The 
exchange below followed: 
 
Judge: All right, I think I heard enough. 
 




Judge: [To Litigant 1] Your affect and interruptions suggest to me that 
you’re not mentally in a position to go forward with this case. Based 
on this, I don’t find your testimony credible. Although I appreciate 
your apologies, they come with continued ill behavior. There’s also 
constant murmuring. 
 
Litigant 1: Really your honor? When your son has been raped by your 
baby dad, and when this man is getting away with it, I could care less 
what you think about me, but you may go on. 
 
Judge: Accordingly, I am going to dismiss your case and hope you will 
seek medical attention. 
 
Litigant 1: Thank you. I will. Thank you. 
 
Judge: [To Litigant 2] I am also going to dismiss your petition. I don’t 
think issuing a protective order is going to make things better. And I 
don’t see enough evidence. 
 
Litigant 2: What am I supposed to do? Keep calling the police? 
 
Judge: Do the same thing you would do with or without a protection 
order. I understand, sir, but I don’t think a protective order is the 
appropriate remedy. 
 
In announcing a sudden dismissal of both cases, the judge cited Litigant 1’s courtroom 
behavior “affect,” and mental condition as the reason for dismissing her case. The 
judge did not address Litigant 1’s claims of serious physical abuse. And while the judge 
told Litigant 2 that the judge did not “see enough violence” to support Litigant 2’s 
claims, Litigant 2 did not have an opportunity to say more than a few sentences about 
his claims. Judge 1 simply never heard the facts Litigant 2 might have offered. The 
choice to bar Litigant 2 from offering evidence and argument in his case appeared to 
be based not on anything the judge learned from Litigant 2 himself but only on what 
the judge learned from Litigant 1 when she presented her case. 
 
Judges often seemed to have specific ideas about the type of testimony they 
wanted to hear. Sometimes judges appeared to be searching for confirmation of the 
kind of facts they thought might be relevant in a given case, as the examples below 
illustrate: 
Plainville Judge 1: 




Judge: [Reading petition] All of these events occurred in front of 
children? 
 
Petitioner: They were upstairs.  
 
Judge: But they were present in the house and probably heard? 
Townville Judge 2: 
Judge: Were there marks on your neck?  
Petitioner: No.  
Judge: She just grabbed you by the neck and pushed you?  
Petitioner: Yes. 
Centerville Judge 2: 
Judge: And what was [her] condition emotionally? And physically? 
Torn clothing, anything like that? 
Townville Judge 4 
Judge: He was throwing things. He kicked in the door. He’s the owner 
of the house? He didn’t really beat you up, did he? 
    ___ 
Judge: Did you listen to the question? Focus. You go there, you see his 
truck. He’s in jail. They don’t take your vehicle. Did you open the door? 
Defendant: His truck was there. The police came. [Name] was not 
there. [Name] answered. The police said there was a protective order 
and he had to leave. 
Judge: Did you break the door? 
Defendant: No, the cops let me in. 
Without knowing each case's underlying facts, we cannot say how often judges’ 
controlling approach to hearing management caused them to miss critical information. 
However, it is undeniable that many litigants in our data, particularly defendants, had 
limited opportunities to offer narrative testimony and have their arguments fully heard 




by the court. And of course, in the absence of counsel, litigants did not have the 
opportunity for anyone acting in their interests to do fact investigation that might 
produce evidence supportive of their case – evidence that they did not consider to be 
supportive of their case given their lack of legal training. The lack of opportunity for 
narrative and the tendency to ask leading questions cuts against recommendations in 
guidance literature, which urges judges to allow parties to be fully heard and 
encourages them to ask “neutral” questions. 
 
IV. WHY DO JUDGES BEHAVE SIMILARLY? 
 
This study reveals surprisingly homogeneous behavior by judges in lawyerless 
courts across three diverse jurisdictions, behavior that bears little resemblance to the 
vision for judicial role reform. Rather than offering the accommodation and assistance 
that guidance suggests, judges maintained legal complexity and exercised tight control 
over hearings and party testimony. 
 
Why did the judges in our study behave in similar ways? Why did they resist 
offering explanations and information to litigants and refuse to answer questions? Why 
did they use so much jargon? Why did they limit the evidence they were willing to hear 
and consistently use leading questions to shape testimony? Why did they rely so heavily 
on petitions to drive information gathering? In this section, we suggest three possible 
explanations for judges’ similar behavioral choices.  
 
Critically, we note that each of the factors we describe below are symptoms of 
the fundamental problem in lawyerless courts: civil justice system design.115 American 
civil trial courts were designed for adversarial, procedural contests driven by lawyers 
on both sides of a case. These courts were not designed to be navigated by users who 
lack legal training and must advocate for themselves while facing potentially life-
altering consequences based on the outcome of their cases. The judicial behavior we 
observed is rooted, more than anything else, in the core design and purpose of civil 
courts and the roles judges and lawyers are expected to play in this system. The existing 
incentives for judges to behave in new ways that are helpful to both sides of a pro se 
case are much weaker than judges’ incentives to behave in ways that are more 
consistent with their historical role in civil litigation.  
 
With the backdrop of a civil justice system that was not designed for people 
without counsel, we suggest three factors that may shape the behavior we observed. 
 
115 In previous and ongoing work, we examine broader structural perspectives on this issue. See 
Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan, and Mark, supra note 3; Shanahan and Carpenter, supra note 10; 
Shanahan, Mark, Steinberg, and Carpenter, supra note 116; Steinberg, Problem-Solving Courts, supra note 
9; Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 14; Carpenter, supra note 14; Steinberg, Demand Side 
Reform, supra note 8. 




First and most important is the interaction between sparse formal law and judges’ 
traditional assumptions about their role. Judges in our study consistently reported that 
they were unclear about the ethical bounds of their role. In the face of this ambiguity, 
they appeared to fall back on commonly shared assumptions about how a civil judge 
should behave, assumptions likely shaped by their acculturation and training in the 
legal profession.  
 
Second, judges were under pressure to decide cases quickly in their high-
volume dockets, which limited the amount of time they could spend offering pro se 
assistance. In addition, the incentives to “move” cases along appeared stronger and 
more concrete than the incentive to help people without counsel, incentives that 
included feedback from court administrators about docket management but not about 
pro se assistance.  
 
Third, imbalanced pre-hearing legal assistance in protective order cases 
resulted in petitioners’ having factually and legally well-developed cases while 
defendants did not. Judges’ reliance on petitioners’ pleadings, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, may have been influenced by docket pressure and seemed to limit the 
universe of facts judges were willing to consider. These three factors may have exerted 
independent pressure that shaped particular aspects of judges’ behavior and may also 
have acted in concert to influence how judges operationalize their role in lawyerless 
courts. We discuss each of these factors in more detail below.  
 
A. ETHICAL AMBIGUITY AND JUDICIAL ROLE ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Previous research has suggested that state trial court judges face ethical 
ambiguity regarding the proper scope and nature of their role in lawyerless cases.116 In 
prior studies, judges have described a process of on-the-job role development and a 
lack of clarity in how to implement ethical standards.117 In interviews, the judges in 
our study confirmed their struggles to balance duties of impartiality and fairness with 
the practical task of assisting pro se parties in a system not designed for litigants without 
lawyers. In fact, despite the lack of assistance judges offered to litigants in the courts 
we observed, we show below that judges believed they were doing all that they could 
to assist people without counsel within the bounds of their role.  
 
In the face of ethical ambiguity, judges may have defaulted to their original 
training as lawyers in an adversarial system, including baseline assumptions about the 
appropriate judicial role including the importance of appearing impartial and unbiased. 
 
116 See Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 13; Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan, and Mark, supra 
note 3; Carpenter, supra note 13. 
117 Id. 




The judges in our study were all lawyers before they took the bench.118 All were trained 
in a relatively homogenous legal education system.119 The norms of adversary process 
and the tracks worn by years of legal training and practice may ultimately be far too 
ingrained in judges’ minds and behaviors to be overcome by merely permissive ethical 
rules, the pressure of pro se dockets, or admonishments from judicial training programs.  
 
In interviews, when we asked judges how they think about and approach their 
role in pro se cases, they described fairness as their touchstone principle and how this 
principle required them to intervene in and manage pro se cases, a finding consistent 
with previous research.120 However, the judges also described their struggles with the 
ethical bounds of their role, articulating that they had to find their own, individualized 
approach to ensuring fairness in the courtroom, or as one judge put it, “go rogue.”121 
Notably, judges in Centerville, who were required to attend regular training programs 
about running dockets, described similar challenges as judges in Plainville, who 
received no such training.  
 
Plainville Judge 1 said, “I did look at the canons, but I did not find that it was 
helpful. I developed a “smell test.” Judges in Centerville expressed similar ideas. 
Centerville Judge 1, for example, articulated a lack of sufficient guidance and did not 
think the judicial role in pro se courts was “particularly codified.” Judge 1 added, “I 
don’t see it as a developed jurisprudence. I think dealing with pro se litigants is in its 
nascent phase.” Centerville Judge 1 also said it is important to be “tethered by the law” 
and then went on to say: 
 
In a few cases I think I made a difference. That’s what I want anyway, 
to make a difference for people. But it is so hard just to be the referee 
but also want to get involved…The natural inclination is to help the 
side that is unrepresented, but you are still cabined by judicial 
ethics…I’m good at violating—that’s not the right word—I’m good at 
 
118 BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 14–15 (2010) 
(noting that judges have a shared background as lawyers and “tend to come from a very select group of 
individuals who have thrived within the institution of legal thought”). We note, though, the 
phenomenon of non-lawyer judges in the also under-researched field of municipal courts, which serve 
both criminal and civil functions. See Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 
964 (2020) (discussing the criminal law functions of municipal courts). 
119 Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 1, 40 
(2012) (“Legal training is largely homogeneous – lawyers are trained in effectively identical law schools 
with the same curriculum and methods.”); Matthew J. Wilson, U.S. Legal Education Methods and Ideals: 
Application to the Japanese and Korean Systems, 18 CARDOZO K. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW 295, 295–97, 300 
(2010) (“The curriculum at most U.S. law schools follows a standard pattern.”); Carole Silver, Getting 
Real About Globalization and Legal Education: Potential and Perspectives for the U.S., 24 STAN. L. & POLˈY REV. 
457, 464 (2013) (noting that U.S. law schools have a “somewhat standardized” curriculum, particularly 
in the first year). 
120 See Carpenter, supra note 13, at 685. 
121 For a discussion of similar findings from previous research, see Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra 
note 13. 




going rogue. The ends justify the means kind of thing…So I have to 
push hard on myself to say, “what are the rules, what am I allowed to 
do.” The rules say I can’t speak with [unrepresented people] for a 
particular reason, but I’ve always pushed that. I won’t do things I can’t 
do, but otherwise I’ll push. I’m not saying other judges are wrong, but 
they’ll say, “I can’t help you I’ve got my rules.” 
 
Plainville Judge 2 also expressed the sense that a judge had to “bend” the rules or get 
close to a “limit” to help unrepresented people.  
 
I’ll help [unrepresented people] out more than I should, and I know 
that. I bend over backwards to help them as much as I can, but, boy, 
there’s a limit to it. Technically, they’re supposed to be held to the same 
level. It’s kinda hard to do that and still believe that you’re running a 
fair court, ‘cause they don’t know how, so I bend it, and I shouldn’t. I 
know I shouldn’t, every time I do it, but I still do it. 
 
To the extent judges fell back on traditional judicial behavior, they may have 
had good reason. Matthew Tokson’s empirical research on judicial decision-making 
draws on cognitive psychology to explain how unconscious biases, including 
preferences for the status quo, shape judges’ behavior.122 His conclusions are 
instructive and consistent with our findings. Tokson suggests that judges may resist 
changes that increase the cost of their own decision making, for example, by 
“increasing the time and effort necessary to address a legal issue or by increasing the 
cognitive difficulty of decision making.” Tokson also suggests judges may develop 
“biases in favor of laws that they have repeatedly applied and justified in the past” 
along with “preferences for familiar doctrines and an aversion to any departure from 
a long-standing status quo.”123 
 
As described in detail in Part I, although many court systems and access to 
justice advocates have recommended ways judges can help people without counsel, 
this guidance material is merely advisory and the gap between such recommendations 
and formal law is massive. Even in Centerville, which has gone farther than most other 
jurisdictions in the country, specific forms of assistance are merely “encouraged,” not 
required, and those encouraged behaviors are discussed in the most summary and 
general terms. The shared ethical confusion across judges in this study suggests that 
efforts like Centerville’s, which are among the strongest in the county, are still not 
sufficient to ensure judges implement recommended pro se assistance. Without more 
scaffolding to support the new judicial role, judges appear to fall back on their legal 
 
122 See Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 916–923 (2015). 
123 Id. at 903.  




training and acculturation, which includes the historical role of judicial passivity as a 
marker of impartiality and judicial assistance for litigants as a marker of bias. These 
findings suggest future research drawing on fields including cognitive psychology and 
behavioral economics could develop our understanding of the role culture, cognition, 
and other mechanisms in creating and influencing judges’ behavior in lawyerless 
courts.124  
 
B. DOCKET PRESSURE 
 
A very pragmatic factor might have shaped the behavior we observed: time.125 
The recommendations for judicial role reform and pro se assistance are inherently time-
consuming. The judges we observed may have had, or perceived that they had, very 
little time to spare. Judges in most lawyerless courts, like those in our study, face 
massive docket pressure from high-volume court calendars. In fact, commentators 
have drawn an analogy between lawyerless civil courts and emergency rooms.126 Like 
the emergency department of a hospital, civil courts have no choice but to process the 
cases brought before them, no matter the resource-constraints they might face.127 
These pressures flow downstream and shape the day-to-day work of trial judges. 
 
In interviews, judges discussed feeling time pressure from litigants—many of 
whom had to wait for long periods, sometimes hours, to have their cases called—and 
from court administrators who wanted to keep court calendars moving. The high-
 
124 Examples include Thaler and Sunstein’s work on behavioral “nudges,” see generally Richard H. 
Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 
(2008) and Lessig’s work on how architecture shapes behavior, see generally Lawrence Lessig, Code 
Version 2.0 (2006). A recent paper by Martha Gayoye, Why Women Judges Really Matter: The Impact of 
Women Judges on Property Law Outcomes in Kenya, 27 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 1 (2021) makes vital 
methodological and substantive points relevant to the future study of civil trial court judges. First, 
Gayoye notes that many existing studies of judges use a lens of “methodological individualism” as 
opposed to “collectivism” – a critique deeply relevant to the U.S. context – and articulates how a 
focus on individual judges can obscure the “collective efforts, actions, and processes” of groups of 
judges, such as women. Second, she shows how women judges in Kenya collaborated to advance 
feminist jurisprudence in property disputes through informal interactions and training of their male 
colleagues and argues for the potential of networks of judges to bring about institutional change. 
125 See Tokson, supra note 122, at 912 (regarding judicial resistance to time and effort costs).  
126 See e.g., Carrie Johnson, Legal Help for the Poor in a ‘State of Crisis’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.npr.org/2012/06/15/154925376/legal-help-for-the-poor-in-state-of-crisis (“This isn't a hospital. 
But it is a kind of emergency room, for people who need help, right away, with all kinds of legal 
problems.”). 
127 See Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 10, at 129 (noting that courts have “no choice” but to serve 
litigants and handle cases “despite the mismatch between design and reality); see also Colleen F. 
Shanahan, Alyx Mark, Jessica K. Steinberg & Anna E. Carpenter, Covid, Crisis, and Courts, 99 TEXAS L. 
REV. ONLINE 10 (2020) (describing the historical challenges of state civil courts and the pandemic-
related intensification of these challenges and resulting innovation); Andrew Hammond, Ariel Jurow 
Kleiman & Gabriel Scheffler, How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has and Should Reshape the American Safety Net, 
105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 154 (2020) (showing how lack of government assistance has 
exacerbated economic and racial inequality historically and how these negative consequences have and 
will continue to increase in the face of the pandemic). 




volume and high-pressure nature of the dockets we observed may influence the extent 
to which judges are willing to take time to offer individualized explanations to 
individual litigants or to give every single litigant the chance to offer lengthy 
testimony.128 As a matter of incentives, the judges in our study faced more external 
pressure to call and decide cases quickly than to offer pro se assistance. 
 
Given the number of cases calendared each day, judges faced daily time 
pressure to call the case of every litigant waiting in the courtroom. They also faced 
longer-term time pressure to ensure cases did not linger on court calendars. In all three 
jurisdictions we observed dozens of protective order cases were calendared for a 
morning time block, typically between nine and early afternoon. The courtrooms were 
often too small for all litigants to sit down, which meant courtrooms could be standing 
room only, particularly at the beginning of a docket call in the morning. Some cases, 
such as those without service on the defendant, could be resolved in less than a minute. 
Evidentiary hearings took much more time.  
 
In Centerville, judges described significant time pressure from court 
administrators. Judge 1 said, “In busy courthouses like this there’s always tension 
between justice and moving the calendar. There’s pressure from the—we call them the 
suits—to move the cases.” 
 
This judge went on to describe how this pressure was systematic, with judges 
throughout the courthouse receiving statistics about docket management: 
 
Yeah, we get these statistics about who’s moving cases, how we’re 
moving cases. We see stats every month, how many trials we’ve done. 
And it’s particular to judges, so you know how you’re doing. We’d 
always have these meetings about moving cases… 
 
Centerville Judge 2 expressed similar sentiments about pressure from court 
administrators and also described a perception of impatience from litigants:  
 
We are under a lot of pressure to get cases resolved. My own approach 
is to manage the issues of moving the case along but feeling I have 
given enough time to the case that I can make a good ruling…The 
litigants even are impatient. I tell them, think about this like going to 




128 As an analogy, one study of federal courts found that increased caseloads led to less scrutiny by 
appellate courts. See Bert Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011). 




Plainville Judge 1 described “a huge pressure” to ensure parties had a swift resolution 
to their case and described starting dockets at nine in the morning and often staying 
on the bench until the afternoon to ensure all of the day’s cases were handled. 
 
The baseline reality of constant pressure to resolve cases may play a key role in 
preventing judges from even attempting to offer pro se assistance. This may be 
particularly true where institutional pressure to “move” cases – such as the pressure 
placed on judges by court administrators in the form of regular reports on case 
statistics – is stronger, more systematic, and contains more feedback loops than any 
pressure they might face to offer assistance to pro se litigants. After all, while some of 
the judges in our study were trained on judicial role reform, none of them received 
routine feedback on how they performed in helping people without counsel. In 
contrast, they did receive feedback on how they were managing their busy, crowded 
dockets.  
 
C. LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR PETITIONERS ONLY  
 
Some of the behavior we observed, particularly judges’ tight control over 
evidence presentation and the constraints they placed on party testimony, could be 
shaped by differences in case development between petitioners and defendants. In the 
courts we studied, only petitioners received robust, systematic, pre-hearing case 
development assistance.129 Defendants did not. As a result, petitioners’ pleadings were 
the only written articulation of factual and legal allegations in any given case. Judges 
leaned heavily on these pleadings to shape how they controlled and managed evidence 
presentation.  
 
The fact that petitioners’ cases were succinctly and predictably presented in a 
form pleading may have, unconsciously or consciously, led judges to rely on them and 
constrained their thinking about the possible universe of claims or defenses in a given 
case. This possibility, combined with docket pressure, may have influenced judges to 
take the most straightforward, efficient route to put facts on the record: relying on the 
petition, asking leading questions, and limiting party narrative, a behavior that may not 
be ideal from a pro se assistance or due process perspective, but may be consistent with 
the tangible pressures judges face.130  
 
 
129 For a complete discussion of petitioner assistance and the lack of defendant assistance in the courts 
we studied, as well as the implications of this imbalance, see Steinberg, Carpenter, Shanahan & Mark, 
Judges and Deregulation, supra note 105. In addition, the limited appellate case law on protective orders in 
our study has been powerfully shaped by the small group of legal services lawyers who systematically 
advocate for petitioners. Defendants have no such systematic advocacy. 
130 For a fuller discussion of due process issues for defendants in this study, see id. See also examples 
from the data in Part III(A)(b) infra.  




Even as judges relied on pre-hearing case development for petitioners to share 
hearings, they did not offer counter-balancing assistance to defendants in developing 
defenses during hearings. A possible reason is that judges did not believe they were 
permitted to provide such support in their role as judges. Ethical confusion, 
assumptions about the judges’ proper role, and lack of clarity about acceptable 





This Article highlights a key symptom of what ails lawyerless courts: the 
judicial role’s failings.131 Both the vision for judicial role reform and the pragmatic, 
day-to-day reality of lawyerless courts asks state civil court judges to maintain fidelity 
to impartiality and adversarial procedures and deliver substantive justice while 
simultaneously assisting parties with no training in law and deep personal interests in 
litigation outcomes. Today’s judges are asked to thread this needle in the context of a 
system designed for lawyers to drive all aspects of litigation from the most mundane 
document filings and the development of a factual record and legal arguments to the 
drafting, entering, and enforcement of a final order. In this context, it is no wonder 
that any judge would fail to deliver assistance, accommodation, and simplification – 
along with procedural and substantive justice – for all parties on a 30-case lawyerless 
docket that must be cleared in a single morning. The principles conflict, the rules are 
designed for a different purpose, and goals beyond closing cases are fuzzy at best. 
Today, state civil trial judges are being asked to do something that may not be possible 
given the facts on the ground, rules, cultural context, and structural incentives that 
currently shape their role. 
 
Civil trial courts’ troubles run much deeper than the symptoms of judicial role 
failure this Article reveals. The core problem in state civil trial courts is the disconnect 
between what state civil courts were designed to do—solve legal disputes through 
lawyer-driven, adversarial litigation—and what these courts are asked to do—help 
people without lawyers navigate complex social, economic, and interpersonal 
challenges, most of which are deeply tied to systemic inequality.132 As we have argued 
in the past, there is a fundamental, unresolved mismatch between civil courts’ 
adversarial, litigation-based dispute resolution design (which the principle of judicial 
 
131 Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 11, at 134. To be clear, the failure is embedded in the role and 
how it fits within the legal framework and culture of adversarial civil litigation. Our data do not 
suggest that any one individual judge is personally to blame or that our study reveals “bad apples” 
behavior. In fact, exactly the opposite. The similarity of judge behavior across three jurisdictions point 
to a systemic—not individual or personality-based—diagnosis for the problems we observed. 
132 Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 11, at 129-31. For a critical view of the role lawyers and courts 
play in perpetuating inequality, including a critical analysis of the extent to which market power shapes 
how law is developed and deployed, and by whom, see Kathryn R. Sabbeth, supra note 21.  




impartiality was designed to support) and the nature, scope, and depth of the actual 
problems litigants bring to the courthouse door.133  
 
Based on our previous research and the findings of this study, we see multiple 
paths forward, including many important questions for future research and 
possibilities for reform.  
 
The first is a long-term path that considers the broader structural challenges 
facing state civil courts as institutions within a democratic system of governance. This 
is a radical project of rethinking state courts’ role. It requires reconsidering which 
problems belong in courts, which should be prevented or mitigated through upstream 
solutions and interventions, and which require new conceptions of problem-solving 
processes.  
 
The second is a more immediate path that focuses on judges. Here, 
researchers, policymakers, and court leaders can explore questions about how best to 
influence and shape the future of judging. For example, future work could explore and 
test the relationship between formal legal and ethical guidance aimed at compelling 
behavior change, training that increases capacity for new or different behaviors, and 
resources that help other, non-judge actors play a role in supporting a changed role 
for judges and better experiences for litigants. Such work is necessarily empirical and 
grounded in real-world, real-time experimentation. Fortunately, state courts have 
arguably never been more motivated or invested in experimentation to improve civil 
justice systems.134 The time is ripe for researchers, including socio-legal scholars, to 
partner with courts in this work.  
 
 
133 Id.   
134 See Shanahan, Mark, Steinberg & Carpenter, Covid, Crisis, and Courts, supra note 127, at 11-12. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793724
